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# **Essential Law Practice Management**

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## **Ethics**

**Submitted by Brian Lee Ciyou**



## **ETHICS**

*by Bryan L. Ciyou, Julie C. Dixon, and Vernon E. Lorenz*

### **A. DUTY OF ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION VERSUS LEGAL COST MANAGEMENT.**

#### **1. Introduction.**

Several years ago, states questioned and some trended away from a lawyer's ethical duty to a client for *zealous* representation. (emphasis added). Anecdotal evidence suggests far too many lawyers took this duty literally in their representation of clients; this created tension with other duties of lawyers contained within the codes of ethics. It remains questionable whether this type of duty has a causal connection with increasing legal costs versus other variables.

Legal costs, despite the electronic age and the benefits of "paperless" courts, with almost instantaneous transmission of decisions, and time saving processes with ever-more-sophisticated legal software, continue to rise, although precise numbers are difficult to ascertain. The number of personal, private and business legal fees run on the magnitude of \$100 to \$300 billion, or more, per year in the United States.<sup>1</sup>

#### **2. Controlling Legal Rules.**

This macro view of the United States noted on this ethical subject-matter, the materials now turn to the specific Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct and caselaw which may have application to these principles, zeal and legal cost management.

##### **a. Legal Duty of Zealous Representation.**

##### **1). Rules of Professional Conduct.**

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies, 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, Duke Law School, May 10-11, 2010.

The current version of the ethical rules no longer specifically sets forth in their text or commentary the duty of zealous representation. A *simple* ethical rule mandates diligence: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3. (emphasis added).

Thus, an ethical lawyer is “. . .not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.” Comment 1. In other states, lawyers must be cognizant of the fact that the express text of the ethical rule and/or the commentary still requires “zealous representation.”

## **2). Caselaw.**

Moreover, while this duty was removed from Rule 1.3 a few years ago, it is still embodied in (good) caselaw. In part, these are cases where this duty is analyzed by the prior duty set out in the ethical rule and/or commentary. *See, e.g., E. Miller v. Ryan*, 706 N.E.2d 244, 253 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). However, this has long been a professional duty expected of lawyers under general caselaw and continues as an independent legal duty of some weight. *See, e.g., Van Kirk v. Miller*, 869 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).

### **b. Ethical Rules Governing Cost Management.**

Diligence, and/or zealous representation, links to legal cost management in one direct way as it does not require exhausting every possibility to gain a legal advantage. The lawyer controls the means and the client the objectives. Ind. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3, Comment 1.

This thus interlocks with the scope of representation and allocation of authority between a client and lawyer as set forth under Rule 1.2, which is stated, in full, as follows:

**“(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall**

**consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.** In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.

(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

**(c) A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.**

(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law."

The highlighted portion of Rule 1.2 is the specific text linking these two (2) ethical concepts. The Rule also has critical commentary that makes the point of the highlighted text and ties the means and objectives to the duties of diligence; and this commentary acknowledges the tension this may sometimes create between attorney and client:

"On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as to the expense to be incurred . . . ." Comment 2.

### **c. Attorney's Fees and Costs.**

Because legal fees and costs are a sensitive matter, and are directly tied to diligence/zealous representation and means/objectives, and the subject of a high number of ethical grievances (See Exhibit "1" for the Current Annual Report of the Indiana Supreme Court (herein "ISC") Disciplinary Commission), the rule, Indiana Rule of Professional

Conduct 1.5, is set out, in full, as follows:

**“(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:**

- (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly;
- (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
- (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
- (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
- (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
- (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
- (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expense to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or upon the amount of maintenance, support, or property settlement, or obtaining custody of a child; or

(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in a domestic relations post-judgment collection action, provided the attorney clearly advised his or her client in writing of the alternative measures available for the collection of such debt and, in all other particulars, complies with Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(c).

(c) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

(1) the division is proportionate to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation.

(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and

(3) the total fee is reasonable.” Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5.

Ultimately, the duty of diligence/zeal, and legal cost management, plays out, at least with a disciplinary case (as opposed to civil litigation) under this Rule.

### **3. Practical Balancing of Diligence With Management of Legal Costs.**

There are a number of concepts and legal tools a lawyer may use in practice to balance due diligence with management of legal costs. These apply across the civil spectrum from low-dollar individual cases to multi-million dollar lawsuits between large business entities. Such also have general application to criminal cases.

#### **a. Exhaustive Approaches.**

The first and perhaps most important concept, aside from crossing the line as a zealous advocate, is to understand a client is free to make an informed choice to take an exhaustive approach and explore the more remote legal courses to his/her/its case objective. A one percent (1%) chance of a change in outcome may be enough for a particular client to spend the dollars to

investigate and perhaps try the matter.

Some cases have far greater implications than those that may be measured in dollars and cents. They may reflect corporate image, strategic business decisions, or purely operate on emotion. These are non-legal dynamics that may ethically drive a case. The lawyer's duty, however, is to ensure he/she has distilled this and relayed it to the client.

**b. Limited Approaches.**

Given the American Rule that each side pays their own legal fees and costs, a lawyer and client may well choose to limit the means and scope of the legal objectives. A day in court may well be tempered by the dollar value of the case.

The critical concept for the lawyer is the limitations must be reasonable. For example, it may be unreasonable for a lawyer to agree to try a case without an expert to save that expense. As it relates to the client, he or she must fully understand the implications for limiting the means and scope of the objective.

**c. Future Litigation and Legal Risk.**

In some cases, the lawyer may have the *luxury* of considering minimizing the need for litigation and cost reduction by anticipating this in advance of any litigation. Lawyers, may and should, be mindful of, and advise their clients about, the following:

- ADR solutions and contractual provisions.
- Insuring risk.
- Indemnity agreements.
- Risk management, such as claim investigation and opinion letters utilized in a proactive posture.

**4. Existing Litigation Management Tips.**

In circumstances where litigation is pending, there are a number of tools that may

ultimately help manage litigation costs:

- Determine, retain, and involve the necessary expert early in the case.
- Assess the real exposure of the case in terms of business image, costs of prosecution or defense, time value of money, best and worst days in court of a given venue, and identify a source for attorney fee recovery or punitive damages.
- Understand and stay on top of the calendar, allowing sufficient time to address foreseeable permutations of the case.
- Learn about the judge, jury pool, nature of and community standards.
- Develop a clear theme for prosecution or defense of a case.

**5. Conclusion.**

Diligent and, sometimes zealous counsel, *coupled* with the costs of the litigation, must be considered in the overall context of the objective of the case during the duration of litigation. (emphasis added). The ability to continually evaluate, re-evaluate, and understand the respective client and his/her/its objective and the means thereto; controlling ethical rules; and the theme of the case are the hallmarks of an effective advocate.

## **B. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW PREVENTION**

### **1. Introduction.**

There are three (3) foreseeable ways an attorney, law firm, or third party may unwittingly or carelessly engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The first occurs by virtue of a lawyer or firm practicing across state boundaries, in states in which they are not admitted to practice. This can easily occur in state border areas.

The second is by a licensed lawyer whose agents, legal secretaries, paralegals, or legal assistants act beyond the appropriate scope. An example may be where a paralegal advises a client to do X or Y, not based on direct instruction from the attorney, but based on past directives of counsel in other cases.

The third, last and perhaps hardest to quantify or qualify, is what acts constitute the practice of law by an unauthorized person or entity. Each is addressed in turn herein.

### **2. Controlling Legal Rules.**

The point of departure in analyzing unauthorized practice of law is to determine the controlling legal rules. Ultimately, the ISC has the authority to regulate the practice of law and determines what acts/or omissions rise to this level. As a corollary, it is the ISC who has exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the unauthorized practice of law.

This is afforded by a constitutional provision, and reflected in two (2) primary sources of law, along with several secondary sources of authority.

#### **a. The Indiana Constitution.**

Under the Indiana Constitution, the ISC has original jurisdiction in the following



circumstances, including the practice of law:

“The Supreme Court shall have no original jurisdiction except in admission to the practice of law; discipline or disbarment of those admitted; the unauthorized practice of law; discipline, removal, and retirement of justices and judges; supervision of the exercise of jurisdiction by the other courts of the State; and issuance of writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as specified by the rules except that appeals from a judgment imposing a sentence of death shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall have, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to review all questions of law and to review and revise the sentence imposed.” Ind. Const. Art. 7, § 4.

**b. Primary Law.**

**1). Indiana Code.**

The Legislature has specifically acknowledged this constitutional right, presumably under the separation of powers, and codified the ISC’s authority as well:

“(a) The supreme court has jurisdiction in appeals coextensive with the state and has jurisdiction as provided by the Constitution of the State of Indiana. (b) The supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction to: (1) admit attorneys to practice law in all courts of the state; and (2) issue restraining orders and injunctions in all cases involving the unauthorized practice of the law; under the rules and regulations as the supreme court may prescribe.” Ind.Code § 33-24-1-2.

**2). Caselaw.**

Not surprisingly, the caselaw uniformly restates the foregoing as the original (sole) jurisdiction for this is reserved unto the ISC. The critical dimension derived from the case development is how the ISC’s authority is rooted in a sound policy:

“This Court’s authority to set standards for and supervise the practice of law arises from the need to protect the public from those who are not properly licensed or qualified to act as attorneys.” *State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Association v. United Financial Systems Corp.*, 926 N.E.2d 8, 14 (Ind.2010).

**c. Secondary Law.**

Numerous rules directly or inherently refer to, and implicate, the ISC's original jurisdiction to handle all matters relating to the practice of law. For example, the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure state:

The ISC has "...exclusive jurisdiction over . . . (a) Admission to practice law; (b) The discipline and disbarment of attorneys admitted to the practice of law; and (c) The unauthorized practice of law (other than criminal prosecutions therefor)." Ind. App. Rule 4(B)(1)(a)-(b).

**3. Remedies for Violation.**

Where there is a violation and the unauthorized practice of law occurs, there are a number of criminal and civil remedies available.

**a. Criminal Act.**

The first is found in the penal law; it is a crime to practice law without a license in Indiana. The provision is set forth in the statutory scheme governing the practice of law, not the criminal code found in Title 35:

"A person who: (1) professes to be a practicing attorney; (2) conducts the trial of a case in a court in Indiana; or (3) engages in the business of a practicing lawyer; without first having been admitted as an attorney by the supreme court commits a Class B misdemeanor." Ind.Code § 33-43-2-1.

The sentencing for a Class B misdemeanor is as follows:

"A person who commits a Class B misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one hundred eighty (180) days; in addition, he may be fined not more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000.00)." Ind.Code § 35-50-3-3.

**1). Penal Law Does Not Violate Separation of Powers.**

In a novel challenge to this criminal statute, the defendant in *Levy v. State*, 799 N.E.2d 71 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), filed a motion to dismiss criminal charges for unauthorized practice of law. The central theory was the Legislature did not have the authority to criminalize the unauthorized

practice of law because the ISC alone has exclusive jurisdiction. *Id.* at 72.

Therefore, as the argument goes, the Legislature's enactment of the penal law violated the separation of powers under Article 3, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. *Id.* at 75. The trial court denied this request. *Id.* at 71. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected this argument. *Id.* at 76.

Thus, a person engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be criminally charged and convicted. In addition, other criminal acts may lie by the unauthorized practice of law, most notably offenses against property. Ind.Code § 35-43-1 *et seq.*

**b. Civil Equitable and Legal Remedies.**

**1). Injunctive Relief.**

The most obvious remedy for other unauthorized practice of law situations lies in injunctive relief. This is set forth in the statutory provision adopted by the Legislature. Ind.Code § 33-24-1-2.

This provision carries over into the Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and for the Discipline of Attorneys, Rule 24. This rule is set forth, in part, as follows:

“Original actions, under I.C. 33-24-1-2, to restrain or enjoin the unauthorized practice of law in this state may be brought in this court by the attorney general, the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, the Indiana State Bar Association or any duly authorized committee thereof, without leave of court, and by any duly organized bar association by leave of court. The action against any person, firm, association or corporation, shall be brought by verified petition, in the name of the state of Indiana, on the relation of the authorized person or association or committee, and shall charge specifically the acts constituting the unauthorized practice.” *Id.*

While other provisions of Rule 24 allow the recovery of costs and expenses incurred by the losing party, this has recently been interpreted not to include attorney fees. *State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Association v. United Financial Systems Corporation*, 926 N.E.2d 8, 14 (Ind.2010). In this case a company created trusts without a lawyer drafting and reviewing these

instruments. In the decision, however, it set forth that disgorgement of monies collected under the guise of legal services may also be a remedy. *Id.* at 19.

## **2). Legal Remedies.**

There are a number of contractual and tort theories under which an individual or entity engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be sued. An attorney suing, or defending, with respect to an unauthorized practice of law case, should closely follow the outcome of class-action brought following the ISC's decision in *State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Association v. United Financial Systems Corporation*, 926 N.E.2d 8, 14 (Ind.2010).

## **4. Standard to Determine Unauthorized Practice of Law.**

Where unauthorized practice is in question, the thorny legal issue is where the line is drawn between ordinary acts of life that have a legal dimension versus the practice of law. There are two (2) unifying components threading through the unauthorized practice of law doctrine that helps to weigh these cases.

### **a. Personal Nature of Relationship.**

The first is the nature of the relationship itself: the person/entity (who may be legally deemed a proxy (albeit illegal) for attorney and thus in need of a license) and the "client." The test for whether this is met has been variously stated, a succinct summary as follows:

"The practice of law has been described as 'the giving of legal advice to a client and the placing of oneself in the very sensitive relationship' involving the 'confidence of the client' and 'the management of his affairs.'" *Charter One Mortgage Corp. v. Condra*, 865 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind.2007), *citing In re Perrello*, 86 N.E.2d 177, 179 (Ind.1979).

### **b. Policy of Protecting Public.**

An obvious public policy comes into play as the second component of the standard. This is confining the practice of law to licensed attorneys. Such is to protect the public from the potentially severe consequences of following advice on legal matters from unqualified persons.

*Charter One*, 86 N.E.2d at 605.

On the other hand, the ISC has been consistent and provided flexibility so as not to unreasonably include basic tasks as the practice of law. Stated differently, it is not intended to reserve to attorneys activities that may be safely conducted by laypersons. *Id.*

**c. The Variables.**

From these two (2) parts of the case standard, a number of variables may be distilled that the ISC has consistently looked to, to determine whether the act or omission in question constitutes the practice of law. They are identified as follows:

- Fiduciary relationship.
- Giving of confidential information.
- Advice clearly legal in nature.
- Burden to society if limited to lawyers.

**5. Tips to Prevent Unauthorized Practice of Law.**

**a. Practicing Beyond the Jurisdictional Boundary.**

**1). Admission Pro Hac Vice.**

Where an attorney desires to solicit business in a state in which he or she is not admitted to practice, the appropriate remedy is to have Indiana counsel and, if necessary, seek admission to the Indiana bar pursuant to a *pro hac vice* appointment. This is governed by Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2), which is stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(a) . . . The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Tax Court, or a trial court, in the exercise of discretion, may permit a member of the bar of another state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, not admitted pursuant to Rule 21, to appear in any particular proceeding, only if the court before which the attorney wishes to appear determines that there is good cause for such appearance . . . .”

**2). Cases on Point.**

**a). Personal Injury Attorneys from Other Jurisdiction Seeking Clients in Catastrophic Injury Case.**

A more recent Indiana case makes the point of how the unauthorized practice of law may occur where catastrophic (high dollar value) litigation is at hand. *In the Matter of George W. Murgatroyd, III*, 741 N.E.2d 719 (Ind.2001). In this case, two (2) California attorneys, who were not admitted to the Indiana bar, or had been admitted *pro hac vice*, sent written solicitations to family members of military personnel who were killed in an aircraft crash. *Id.* at 720.

This was challenged as an unauthorized practice of law (there are proper restraints on commercial speech under the First Amendment). The ISC found dispositive the fact that, viz-a-vie these solicitations to prospective clients, these attorneys held themselves out as available to act in a representative capacity for plaintiffs in Indiana courts. *Id.* at 721. In fact, they were not. *Id.* at 721. Ultimately, on an agreed judgment, the ISC restrained this conduct, but went on to note had they proceeded, the discipline may have different. *Id.* at 722.

**b). Attorney from Contiguous State Practicing in Indiana.**

In *In the Matter of John M. Hughes*, 833 N.E.2d 459 (Ind.2005), the ISC issued a public reprimand to an Indiana attorney who allowed a Michigan attorney to perform pre-trial and mediation-related services in Indiana state court case. The Michigan attorney was also listed on the law firm's letterhead and in office telephone greeting, such not indicating any licensing qualification.

**b. Legal Assistants/Office Staff.**

The bottom line with regard to office staff, legal assistants, paralegals, and the like, is it is the attorney who is responsible from an ethical and civil liability (tort) standpoint for these employees (and contractors) for their acts and omissions.

**1). Controlling Legal Rules.**

Under the rules contained in Section 9 of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, this is expressly set out: “A non-lawyer shall perform services only under the direct supervision of a lawyer authorized to practice in the State of Indiana and in the employ of the lawyer or the lawyer’s employer.” Rule 9.1 (See **Exhibit “2” for the complete text of the ethical rules titled, “Use of Non-Lawyer Assistants”**).

This provision of the Rules goes on to set forth what duties a lawyer may delegate and those he or she may not. The practical aspects of non-lawyer assistants, such as identification on the firm letterhead, billing, education, and ethics is also addressed.

## **2). Cases on Point.**

In *In the Matter of Richard J. Thonert*, 693 N.E.2d 559 (Ind.1998), attorney Thonert was suspended. During his suspension, his office staff (not lawyers) communicated to public officials, produced motions, pleadings, and agreed entries and communicated with the suspended attorney’s clients. For this reason, his suspension was extended. Attorney Thonert was liable for the acts of his staff which constituted the unauthorized practice of law.

### **c. Third Parties (Unauthorized Practice of Law).**

Over time, the ISC has decided a number of cases at the margins under this legal topic under the given standard and its variables, and set forth relatively black and white rules for what does or does not constitute the practice of law:

- Filling in blanks on a form mortgage instrument is not the practice of law. *Charter One Mortgage Corporation v. Condra*, 865 N.E.2d 602 (Ind.2007).
- Selecting and completing, by a person who advertised to provide immigration services, immigration forms, is the unauthorized practice of law. *ISBA ex rel. v. Diaz*, 838 N.E.2d 433 (Ind.2005).
- Filling in blanks on a form prepared by attorneys is allowed by real estate brokers, and is not the practice of law. These forms include listing agreements, earnest money contract propositions, offers to purchase, options, options with



listing clauses, affidavits (real estate vendor), purchase agreements, exchange agreements, bills of sale, leases (short forms), and contracts of sale. *ISBA ex rel. v. Indiana Reals Estate Association, Inc.*, 191 N.E.2d 711 (1963).

- Preparing and selling estate and trust and will documents is the unauthorized practice of law. *ISBA ex rel. v. United Financial Systems Corporation*, 926 N.E.2d 8 (Ind.2010); *ISBA ex rel. v. Northouse*, 848 N.E.2d 668 (Ind.2006).
- A business operating under the name “Legal Research Agency,” given communication with an inmate on a post-conviction matter, was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and enjoined. *Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission v. Owen*, 486 N.E.2d 1012.
- A former attorney, who had resigned from the bar, committed the unauthorized practice of law by representing estate planning service to the general public as general counsel for a business, particularly where he maintained his bar admission certificate on the office wall. This former attorney was also found in indirect contempt of the ISC. The ISC warned that if the former attorney continued in the future, it would view imprisonment as the appropriate sanction for contempt. *In the Matter of Contempt of the Supreme Court of Indiana v. Mittower*, 693 N.E.2d 555 (Ind.1998).

## **6. Conclusion.**

Ultimately, the unauthorized practice law may occur in one (1) of three (3) primary ways: practicing beyond one’s jurisdictional boundaries; a person practicing improperly under the lawyer’s authority; or in acts/omissions that inherently may be fiduciary in nature and require the special skills of a lawyer. Awareness of these materials will mitigate or eliminate this risk.



**C. CLARIFYING THE START OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WHEN COMMUNICATING VIA THE FIRM WEBSITE.**

**1. Introduction.**

On January 1, 2011, the ISC's new and/or changed rules on attorney advertising went into effect. Three (3) critical points should be considered with the new rules.

First, *they do* include electronic communications under the included communications that must be ethical. (emphasis added). Second, however, *they do not* address social media specifically. (emphasis added and analyzed *infra*). Third, there is no provision for pre-review of advertising communications or other materials to determine if they comport with the rules of ethics. The Indiana Lawyer.com, "Rewriting the rules on attorney advertising", October 27, 2010.

As it relates to the specific topic of this NBI seminar, several steps must be taken to understand and clarify, as necessary, what forms an attorney-client relationship. This is critical as the formation of the attorney-client relationship brings certain rights and duties upon the attorney and client. Presumably, the same legal analysis applies to both traditional and on-line communications via a firm's website in determining when the relationship begins.

**2. Viewing the Firm's Website.**

What appears clear under these Rules is that a website is a communication about the lawyer or the law firm's services and its content must be truthful. Rule 7.1. The Commentary to this Rule specifies that Rule 7.1 "governs all communications about a lawyer's services, including advertising allowed by Rule 7.2."

Under caselaw, an attorney relationship only exists by consent. This requires two-way

communication:

“An attorney-client relationship need not be express, but may be implied by the conduct of the parties. Attorney-client relationships have been implied where a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, where the advice sought pertains to matters within the attorney’s professional competence, and where the attorney *gives* the desired advice or assistance.” *Douglas v. Monroe*, 743 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). (emphasis added) (internal cites and quotations omitted).

In *Douglas* the communication was traditional, person-to-person, but the same analysis is instructive to all communications, the many forms they may take. Precisely, Carol’s adult child, named Curtis, drowned in a swimming pool. She was considering the possibility of filing suit. However, she was undecided because she was still grieving over the loss of Curtis.

Her brother, Lionel, who worked as a bank security guard, recognized Monroe, who was known to Lionel as an attorney, in the lobby. Lionel had a short conversation with Monroe about the statute of limitations (two years) and indicated that his counsel might be sought. Monroe did not mention a 180-day limit in which to file a tort claim, nor that Lionel should not rely on this advice.

Ultimately, Carol spoke with her counsel, who informed her that the notice of tort claim time limit had passed. Carol then sued Monroe, under a malpractice theory, wherein she alleged Monroe’s failure to inform Lionel of the 180-day tort claims notice and failure to timely file it, was actionable. Monroe answered, denying the allegations.

Monroe then moved for summary judgment, asserting no attorney-client relationship existed and therefore, the malpractice claims must fail. The trial court granted summary judgment for Monroe, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. As a part of the holding, the Court of Appeals noted “ . . .the mere provision of nominal legal advice is not automatically dispositive where the existence of an attorney-client relationship is disputed.” *Id.* at 1185.

Inasmuch under this case, a one-way communication channel appears to be legally

insufficient to establish an attorney-client relationship, whether the query from a putative client be made in person, written form, or the e-world.

### **3. E-Mail Exchange Component of Website.**

Where the legal issue becomes more complex is where there is two-way communication. This is most likely to occur with *contactus@* or personal attorney e-mails provided within a firm's website. (emphasis added). Typically, these are contained and found on the home page, attorney biography page, and contact us page. Again, as indicated above, a one-way e-mail, standing alone, is likely insufficient as a matter of law to support an attorney-client relationship.

On the other hand, where an exchange of information between a lawyer/firm and a putative client takes place, the more likely it is the firm and attorney are to fall within the situation raised in *Douglas* case, making at least a good-faith basis for a malpractice claim against the attorney or firm.

The element of particular legal concern is the lack of any other circumstances to qualify the context. For instance, with an in-person communication or telephone call (i.e., tone of voice, duration of meeting), there is some factual context. The e-mails may stand alone.

To this end, given there is a doctrine of implied contract, the prudent firm must be aware of the subjective nature by which this malpractice action may be judged:

"An important factor is the putative client's subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in his professional capacity and on his intent to seek professional advice." *In re Anonymous*, 655 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.1995).

More specifically, the concern is that a legal consumer may not understand that sending a question and providing contact information does not create an attorney-client relationship. This is more the case where there is an e-dialogue.

In addition, any information provide by a putative client is not confidential or subject to

the protection of the evidentiary privilege. It is only when an attorney is consulted on business within the scope of his/her profession, the communication on the subject with the client is strictly confidential. The privilege applies to all communications between the client and his or her attorney for the purpose of obtaining professional legal advice. *Corll v. Edward Jones*, 656 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), citing *Colman v. Heidenreich* (1978), 381 N.E.2d 866, 869 (quoting *Jenkinson v. State*, (1840) 5. Blackf.465, 466). This is what makes the attorney an incompetent witness, effectuating the privilege. Ind.Code § 34-46-3-1.

As a general thesis, there are countervailing propositions to consider as it relates to the subjective nature of implied contract, should the attorney find this situation presents itself. In the e-age, all consumers have an expectation that they may engage a company and receive a response by an e-mail. This is good marketing and business as well. It is unrealistic that lawyers and law firms would not follow this trend. However, there is little legal guidance and this is a risk-laden area.

The other position is for a lawyer and law firm to have minimal e-mail communication with potential clients; but this is unrealistic.

Ultimately, until this area of the law develops, the prudent lawyer and firm will insure against the risk. In addition, all conscientious attorneys will review their legal malpractice policy and determine how this legal risk is (or is not) covered. It is conceivable that a lawyer could be faced with defending a case in a far-flung jurisdiction if he or she is not careful.

#### **4. Techniques to Avoid Website Users From Perceiving Creation of Attorney-Client Relationship.**

##### **a. Disclaimer.**

The most widely used technique to qualify that a website does not provide a communication mechanism, that standing alone, constitutes and creates an attorney-client

relationship is by a disclaimer/notice or similar language on the home page. Depending on needs (the practice areas) and risk management, this disclaimer/notice, or the like, may be posted on each subsequent page within the site. An example of such text is provided (See **Exhibit “3,” Ciyou & Dixon, P.C. disclaimer**).

**b. Checkbox System.**

An alternative method advocated by legal scholars and legal ethicists is a checkbox as a pass key into the content of the site. This is not widely used, at least in Indiana. Under this concept, much as with credit card on-line services, all who access the site must affirm he or she has read the firm’s disclaimer/notice, and perhaps privacy statement, to move beyond the disclaimer and/or home page of the site. Presumably, this clearly and expressly sets forth that no access to and use of the website, nor e-mail, creates an attorney-client relationship.

Where considered, this may be problematic if the firm’s website is also designed for client access and use. It would have to be carefully designed. All of these raise a corollary issue, which is commercial data privacy. At present the United States Department of Commerce, Internet Policy Task Force, is floating a framework to address this concern. All interested readers should study this 78 page report titled, “Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework.”

**5. Conclusion.**

There is no uniformity amongst law firms in how they address the potential that a putative client may perceive e-communications with the firm and attorney as creating an attorney client relationship. Except, most firms do use disclaimers on their home page.

Any legal research and comparisons needed should come from presumed application of legal standards applied to establishing an attorney-client relationship by other types of

(traditional) communication. In addition, lawyers should look to more cutting edge approaches taken by other states and stay abreast of any state or national policy developments.

Ultimately, the prudent course is to insure this risk and the companion risks associated with the modern law firm interacting in the electronic world. Do you know the provisions of your malpractice policy?

## **D. ADVERTISING LEGAL SERVICES ETHICALLY.**

### **1. Introduction.**

The topic of the ethical advertising of legal services in the traditional media have only recently solidified, namely what the ethical boundaries are regarding television ads, newsprint ads, and direct communication with perspective clients. **(See Exhibit “2” for the complete text of the ethical rules titled “Information About Legal Services,” which contains the newly revised rules effective January 1, 2011).**

Indeed, it is important to remember that it was not until 1977 that the United States Supreme Court (first) determined that attorney advertising was a form of commercial speech entitled to First Amendment Protection. *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona*, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Traditional forms of advertising and their developed ethical rules are thus first addressed herein.

While the ethical rules were developing with the allowance of (traditional) attorney advertising, the computer era harkened in and allowed for the widespread use of e-mail and websites. These still present complex, unresolved ethical issues in the embryonic stage. **Firm websites and e-mail are generally addressed in Section “C” *supra*.**

Critically, the social media has come into the mainstream and marginalized earlier forms of e-communication (websites and e-mail) and traditional advertising. Stated differently, the social media are rapidly challenging and changing (and in some cases, replacing all together) earlier e-staples and traditional methods of advertising legal services and marketing.

There are no current ethical rules specifically governing the use of social media. It is

obvious that legal ethics apply, and lawyers should adhere to the public policies identified and driving the more developed ethical rules on advertising.

In fact, it is only as of January 1, 2011, that the internet and electronic communications are addressed in the ethical rules at all. Each and everyone of us will cross some of these undeveloped and thorny ethical issues if we practice into the not-to-distant future, with e-mail, websites, and social media.

## **2. Attorney Communications.**

A threshold principle is that any communication generated by, or on behalf of, an attorney must not be false or misleading. Rule 7.1 A communication is false and/or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law. *Id.* This rule applies to *all* communications, written, oral, electronic or otherwise. (emphasis added).

## **3. Traditional Advertising.**

In addition, a communication made by an attorney or firm may constitute advertising. If so, the communication is subject to other Rules of Professional Conduct. As noted in other sections of this material, the ethical rules regarding lawyer advertising materially changed effective January 1, 2011.

Under the present variant of the Rules, advertising is defined or characterized, as follows:

“The term ‘advertising’ as used in these Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct refers to any manner of public communication partly or entirely intended or expected to promote the purchase or use of the professional services of a lawyer, law firm, or any employee of either of a lawyer, law firm, or any employee of either involving the practice of law or law-related services.” Rule 7.2(a).

### **a. All Advertising.**

With all legal advertising communications, there are a number of general ethical principles that must be followed and adhered to:



- All communications, including advertising, must be honest and not contain false material statements of fact or law. Rule 7.1.
- As a general rule, a lawyer cannot give anything of value to a person recommending or advertising the lawyer's services. Rule 7.2 (b). There two (2) common exceptions:
  - Paying the reasonable cost of advertisements or communications permitted by the ethical rules. Rule 7.2(b)(1). **Common written examples are the Bluebook or Yellow Pages. In the electronic world, a firm's website is likely to fall within/under this exception.**
  - Paying the usual charges of a qualifying legal services referral plan. Rule 7.2(b)(2). **An example is the Indianapolis Bar Association referral plan.** See Rule 7.3(d).

In essence, this is all passive advertising, thereby the link between a lawyer and any putative client is indirect. This lawyer is just one of many choices that may be considered by such a person, when and if a legal need arises.

Even so, however, there are two (2) specific requirements the attorney and/or firm must adhere to with this less restricted form of advertising:

- The advertising communication must state the name and address of at least one lawyer or the law firm responsible for its content. Rule 7.2(c).
- The lawyer or law firm must maintain a copy or recording of such communication for six (6) years after its dissemination. Rule 7.2 (c).
  - Undeveloped Area for Website Revisions: An undeveloped legal area and question is presented with electronic media, since even the slightest change to the firm's website, if this Rule applies to it, would require archival of the prior version as of a date certain.

#### **b. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.**

With the newly adopted revisions, this Rule bifurcates personal injury and disasters from other perspective clients who may need specific legal services. Each is addressed under what is

effectively actively advertising to a specific person, defined by the Rule as:

A “ . . . written, recorded, or electronic communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment from a prospective client potentially in need of services in a particular matter . . . .” Rule 7.3(c).

**An electronic communication includes the Internet.** Rule 7.3 (b).

### **1). In-Person Contact.**

As a broad principle, the Rule does not allow direct in-person contact as set forth in the general rule:

“A lawyer (including a lawyer’s employee or agent) shall not by *in-person, live telephone, or real time electronic contact* solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain . . . .”Rule 7.3(a). (emphasis added).

As with most legal rules, there are exceptions. The two (2) most common and applicable exceptions are as follows: (1) the prospective client is a lawyer; or (2) the prospective client has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer. Rule 1.3(a)1)-(2).

### **2). Direct Contact Not Permitted.**

In addition, all other forms of direct contact are prohibited in several circumstances:

- Prospective client makes known he/she does not want to be solicited by the lawyer. Rule 7.3(b)(1).
- Lawyer’s solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment. Rule 7.3(b)(2).
- Personal injury (see analysis hereinafter). Rule 7.3(b)(3).
- Solicitation involves a specific matter and lawyer should reasonably know the potential client is represented. Rule 7.3(b)(4).
- Lawyer knows or reasonably should know person’s emotional state makes it unlikely he or she can exercise reasonable judgment in employing the lawyer. Rule 7.3(b)(5).

### **3). Direct Contact Permitted with Disclaimer.**

Nevertheless, a lawyer may send a client a written, recorded, or electronic

communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment from a prospective client potentially in need of legal services in a particular matter; however, it must be so labeled, namely as “advertising material.” Rule 7.3(c).

**a). Disclaimer Requirements.**

The advertising communication must be identified as such with different requirement for written versus recorded or electronic communications:

- **Written Materials:** For written materials, the material must contain the words “advertising material” both on the face of any outside envelope and at the beginning of any written communication. This must be conspicuously posted. Rule 7.3(c).
- **Recorded or Electronic Communication:** As it relates to recorded or electronic communications, these words must be stated at the beginning and end of any recorded or electronic communication.

**b). Filing with Disciplinary Commission.**

In addition, a copy of each such communication must be filed with the ISC’s Disciplinary Commission *at or prior to* its dissemination to the prospective client. (emphasis added). A filing fee in the amount of \$50.00 payable to the Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission Fund must accompany each filing. Again it is important to be aware of the fact that there is no pre-approval process. It is thus incumbent on the lawyer to exercise great care in his or her direct advertising.

**4). Cooling Off Period for Injury Direct Contact.**

Where the solicitation concerns an action for personal injury, wrongful death, or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the solicitation is addressed or relative of that person, more than thirty (30) days must have passed before the solicitation is made. Rule 7.3(b)(3).

In addition, the advertising communication must comport with the requirements of other materials addressed to a prospective client the lawyer knows is potentially in need of legal

services in a particular matter. Rule 7.3(c)

#### **4. Social Media.**

##### **a. Description.**

The word **social media** is an umbrella term that may be defined in many ways. The common elements are viewed to be mating a combination of software and hardware to allow social interaction between multiple people who may be across the street or around the world.

##### **b. Statistics of Population and Social Media Use.**

To put the potential power of these tools in perspective, which are, again, in use within Indiana's legal system, some basic statistics are provided:

- **World Population:** 6 Billion 900 Million
  - **US Population:** 311 Million
  - **Indiana Population:** 6 Million 400 Thousand
- 
- **FaceBook Active Users:** 600 Million (2011: Average User Has 130 Friends/People Spend 7 Billion Minutes Per Month on Facebook; Statistics Indicate 11.5% of the World is on FaceBook)
  - **Twitter Users:** 200 Million Users (2011)
  - **YouTube:** 2 Billion Videos Played Per Day (2011)
  - **Number of Blogs:** 133 Million Blogs

##### **c. Use of Social Media in Indiana Law.**

In fact, the very state who licenses us as attorneys, the State of Indiana, viz-a-vie the ISC, actively engages the citizenry by social media. Twitter and YouTube are used as communication tools on the Indiana Courts Official Website, [www.in.gov/judiciary](http://www.in.gov/judiciary). On YouTube, the ISC has the incourts's Channel, [www.youtube.com/incourts](http://www.youtube.com/incourts). With twitter, a person may sign up to get

short timely messages from the Indiana Courts, <http://twitter.com/incourts>.

**d. Ethical Rules and Other Law.**

The foregoing are the totality of ethical rules currently applicable to social media. A number of discussion points will be provided if there is time during the seminar. These distill some of the undeveloped ethical quandaries this new form of communication and advertising has raised:

*Does a judge listed as a Facebook Friend infer the appearance of special influence?*

*Is a blog post a communication subject to an "advertising material" disclaimer?*

*What are the implications for a firm's website viewed by a consumer in a jurisdiction in which the firm does not practice and have attorneys admitted in?*

**5. Conclusion.**

Attorneys are free to advertise so long as it is ethical. However, even this concept is relatively new. False advertising is not an exercise of protected free speech. The legal rules are wholly undeveloped as it relates to social media.

Social media presents a world of opportunity for skilled advocates who desire to educate the public, but this is also laden with risks. Careful application of the rules we have for traditional advertising, coupled with common sense, directed at an informed legal consumer, is the balance to strike.

**E. FIRM E-SECURITY (ADDED SECTION).**

Tim Wilcox, International Investigations, Inc., in Indianapolis, Indiana will discuss some of the dimensions of electronic spying and maintaining the safety, security, and integrity of law firm data. He will answer any of your questions.

This is a new frontier of legal ethics as the law becomes paperless, and it is one in which International Investigators, Inc. specializes. Reproduced in Exhibit "4" are Mr. Wilcox's materials presented to the LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND RISK MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE held in Chicago, Illinois, on Friday, February 18, 2011. (See Exhibit "4" for Mr. Wilcox's materials).

**2008-2009  
ANNUAL REPORT  
OF THE  
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION  
OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA**

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## **INDIANA SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	1
II.	HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION .....	1
III.	THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS.....	3
	A. The Grievance Process .....	3
	B. Preliminary Investigation .....	3
	C. Further Investigation .....	4
	D. Authorizing Charges of Misconduct .....	4
	E. Filing Formal Disciplinary Charges .....	4
	F. The Evidentiary Hearing .....	4
	G. Supreme Court Review .....	5
	H. Final Orders of Discipline .....	5
	I. Resolution by Agreement .....	6
	J. Temporary Suspension .....	7
	K. The License Reinstatement Process .....	8
	L. Lawyer Disability Proceedings .....	8
IV.	COMMISSION ACTIVITY IN 2008-2009.....	8
	A. Grievances and Investigations.....	9
	B. Non-Cooperation .....	9
	C. Trust Account Overdraft Reporting .....	12
	D. Litigation .....	12
	1. Overview .....	12
	2. Verified Complaints for Disciplinary Action.....	13
	3. Final Dispositions.....	13
V.	SUMMARY OF DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION ACTIVITIES .....	17
VI.	AMENDMENTS TO RULES AFFECTING LAWYER DISCIPLINE .....	17
VII.	OTHER DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION ACTIVITIES .....	18
VIII.	FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION .....	18
IX.	APPENDICES:	
	APPENDIX A Biographies of Commission Members	
	APPENDIX B Number of Grievances Filed	
	APPENDIX C Grievance Rates	
	APPENDIX D Grievances by Case Type and Misconduct Alleged	
	APPENDIX E Grievances by Case Type	
	APPENDIX F Grievances by Misconduct Alleged	
	APPENDIX G Disciplinary Sanctions Ordered	
	APPENDIX H Other Disciplinary Commission Activities	
	APPENDIX I Statement of Revenues and Expenses	

## I. INTRODUCTION

This is the annual report of the activities of the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Indiana for the period beginning July 1, 2008 and ending June 30, 2009. The Disciplinary Commission is the agency of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana charged with responsibility for investigation and prosecution of charges of lawyer misconduct. The Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct set forth the substantive law to which lawyers are held accountable by the Indiana lawyer discipline system. The procedures governing the Indiana lawyer discipline system are set forth in Indiana Supreme Court Admission and Discipline Rule 23. The broad purposes of the Disciplinary Commission are to "protect the public, the court and the members of the bar of this State from misconduct on the part of attorneys and to protect attorneys from unwarranted claims of misconduct." Admission and Discipline Rule 23, section 1.

The Disciplinary Commission is not a tax-supported agency. It is funded through an annual fee that each lawyer admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana must pay in order to keep his or her license in good standing. The current annual registration fee for lawyers in active status is \$115.00. After paying the costs of collecting annual fees, the Clerk of the Supreme Court distributes the balance of fees to the Disciplinary Commission, the Commission for Continuing Legal Education and the Indiana Judges and Lawyers Assistance Committee to support the work of those Court agencies. In this fiscal year, of each \$115 annual registration fee, after the Clerk's expenses for collecting fees, 66.37% was distributed to the Disciplinary Commission, 18.9% to the Continuing Legal Education Commission and 14.73% to the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Committee.

The annual registration fee for lawyers in inactive status is \$57.50. The annual registration fee is due on or before October 1st of each year. Failure to pay the required fee within the established time subjects the delinquent lawyer to suspension of his or her license to practice law until such time as the fee and any delinquency penalties are paid.

Out-of-state lawyers who received court permission to practice law temporarily in the state of Indiana are required to pay a \$115 registration fee for each year they are participating as counsel in an Indiana case.

On May 5, 2009, the Supreme Court issued an order suspending 131 lawyers on active and inactive status, effective June 5, 2009, for failure to pay their annual attorney registration fees.

## II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

The Indiana Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of lawyers admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana. Ind.Const. art. 7, § 4. On June 23, 1971, the Indiana Supreme Court created the Disciplinary Commission to function in an investigatory and prosecutorial capacity in lawyer discipline matters.

The Disciplinary Commission is governed by a board of commissioners, each of whom is appointed by the Supreme Court to serve a term of five years. The Disciplinary Commission consists of seven lawyers and two lay appointees.

The Commission meets monthly in Indianapolis, generally on the second Friday of each month. In addition to acting as the governing board of the agency, the Disciplinary Commission considers staff reports on claims of misconduct against lawyers and must make a determination that there is reasonable cause to believe that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct which would warrant disciplinary action before formal disciplinary charges can be filed against a lawyer.

The officers and members of the Disciplinary Commission during the reporting year were:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Hometown</u>	<u>First Appointed</u>	<u>Current Term Expires</u>
Sally Franklin Zweig, Chair	Indianapolis	September 2, 2001	June 30, 2011
Corinne R. Finnerty, Vice-Chair	North Vernon	July 1, 2003	June 30, 2013
Fred Austerman, Secretary	Richmond	July 1, 2003	June 30, 2013
Diane L. Bender	Evansville	July 1, 1999	June 30, 2009
Maureen Grinsfelder	Fort Wayne	July 1, 2005	June 30, 2010
Robert L. Lewis	Gary	July 1, 1999	June 30, 2009
R. Anthony Prather	Indianapolis	July 1, 2004	June 30, 2009
J. Mark Robinson	New Albany	April 11, 2001	June 30, 2011
Anthony M. Zappia	South Bend	September 9, 2001	June 30, 2011

Biographies of Commission members who served during this reporting year are included in **Appendix A**.

The Disciplinary Commission's work is administered and supervised by its Executive Secretary, who is appointed by the Commission with the approval of the Supreme Court. The Executive Secretary of the Commission is Donald R. Lundberg.

The staff of the Disciplinary Commission during this year included:

Greg N. Anderson, Staff Attorney  
 Allison S. Avery, Staff Attorney  
 Rom Byron, Staff Attorney  
 David B. Hughes, Trial Counsel (part-time)  
 Laura B. Iosue, Staff Attorney  
 Charles M. Kidd, Staff Attorney  
 Carol Kirk, Staff Attorney/Investigator  
 Dennis K. McKinney, Staff Attorney  
 Seth T. Pruden, Staff Attorney  
 Fredrick L. Rice, Staff Attorney  
 Robert C. Shook, Staff Attorney  
 Robert D. Holland, Investigator  
 Sharon F. Scholl, Office Manager  
 Judy E. Whittaker, Secretary  
 Ronda Johnson, Secretary

In addition, the Disciplinary Commission employs part-time law students to assist in its work. Law clerks employed during this reporting period included Donald E. Thomas, Jr., Caroline Richardson, Sara A. Vorndran, Amber Malcolm and Lauren E. Berger.

The Disciplinary Commission's offices are located at 30 South Meridian Street, Suite 850, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204.

### **III. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS**

#### **A. The Grievance Process**

The purpose of the Disciplinary Commission is to inquire into claims of attorney misconduct, protect lawyers against unwarranted claims of misconduct, and prosecute cases seeking attorney discipline when merited. Action by the Disciplinary Commission is not a mechanism for the resolution of private disputes between clients and attorneys, but rather is independent of private remedies that may be available through civil litigation.

An investigation into lawyer misconduct is initiated through the filing of a grievance with the Disciplinary Commission. Any member of the bench, the bar or the public may file a grievance by submitting to the Disciplinary Commission a written statement on a form prescribed by the Disciplinary Commission. There are no formal standing requirements for the filing of a grievance. Any individual having knowledge about the facts relating to the complaint may submit a grievance. A Request for Investigation form for submission of grievances is readily available from the Commission's office, from bar associations throughout the state, and on the Internet.

The Disciplinary Commission may also initiate an inquiry into alleged lawyer misconduct in the absence of a grievance from a third party. Acting upon information that is brought to its attention from any credible source, the Disciplinary Commission may authorize the Executive Secretary to prepare a grievance to be signed and issued by the Executive Secretary in the name of the Commission.

#### **B. Preliminary Investigation**

The Commission staff reviews each newly filed grievance to initially determine whether the allegations contained therein raise a substantial question of misconduct. If a grievance does not present a substantial question of misconduct, it may be dismissed by the Executive Secretary with the approval of the Commission, and written notice of dismissal is mailed to the grievant and the lawyer.

A grievance that is not dismissed on its face is sent to the lawyer involved, and a demand is made for the lawyer to submit a mandatory written response within twenty days of receipt. Additional time for response is allotted in appropriate circumstances. Other investigation as appropriate is conducted in order to develop the facts related to a grievance. The Executive Secretary may call upon the assistance of bar associations in the state to aid in the preliminary investigation of grievances. The bar associations that maintain Grievance Committees of volunteer lawyers to assist the Disciplinary Commission with preliminary investigations are: the Allen County Bar Association, the Evansville Bar Association, the Indianapolis Bar Association, the Lake County Bar Association, and the St. Joseph County Bar Association. Upon petition by the Commission, the Supreme Court may suspend the law license of a lawyer who fails to respond in writing to a grievance that has been opened for investigation.

Upon completion of the preliminary investigation and consideration of the grievance and the lawyer's response, the Executive Secretary, with the approval of the Commission, may dismiss the grievance upon a determination that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the lawyer is guilty of misconduct. The grievant and the lawyer are notified in writing of the dismissal.

Lawyers must cooperate with the Commission's investigation by answering grievances in writing and responding to other demands for information from the Commission. The Commission may seek an order from the Supreme Court suspending a non-cooperating lawyer's license to practice until such time as he or she cooperates. If after being suspended for non-cooperation, the lawyer does not cooperate for a period of six months, the Court may indefinitely suspend the lawyer's license. An indefinitely suspended lawyer will be reinstated only after successfully completing the reinstatement process described in paragraph K below.

### **C. Further Investigation**

Those grievances that the Executive Secretary determines present reasonable cause are docketed for further investigation and, ultimately, for full consideration by the Disciplinary Commission. Both the grievant and the lawyer are notified of this step in the process. Upon completion of the investigation, the results of the investigation are summarized in written form by Commission staff, and the matter is presented to the Disciplinary Commission for its consideration at one of its monthly meetings.

### **D. Authorizing Charges of Misconduct**

After a grievance has been investigated, the Executive Secretary reports on it to the Disciplinary Commission, together with his recommendation about the disposition of the matter. The Commission makes a determination whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe the lawyer is guilty of misconduct that would warrant disciplinary action. If the Commission finds that there is not reasonable cause, the matter is dismissed with written notice to the grievant and the lawyer. If the Commission finds that reasonable cause exists, it directs the Executive Secretary to prepare and file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court a verified complaint charging the lawyer with misconduct.

### **E. Filing Formal Disciplinary Charges**

Upon a finding by the Disciplinary Commission that there is reasonable cause to believe the lawyer is guilty of misconduct that would warrant disciplinary action, the Executive Secretary files a verified complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court setting forth the facts related to the alleged misconduct and identifying those provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct that are alleged to have been violated by the lawyer's conduct. The respondent must file an answer to the verified complaint, or else the allegations set forth in the complaint will be taken as true.

### **F. The Evidentiary Hearing**

Upon the filing of a verified complaint, the Supreme Court appoints a hearing officer who will preside over the case and who will submit recommended findings to the Supreme Court. The hearing officer must be an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana and is frequently a sitting or retired judge. Typically, the hearing officer is from a county close to the

county in which the respondent lawyer practices law. The hearing officer's responsibilities include supervising the pre-hearing development of the case including discovery, conducting an evidentiary hearing, and reporting the results of the hearing to the Supreme Court by way of written findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations. A hearing may be held at any location determined to be appropriate by the hearing officer.

#### **G. Supreme Court Review**

After the hearing officer has issued a report to the Supreme Court, either or both of the parties may petition the Court for a review of any or all of the hearing officer's findings, conclusions and recommendations. In every case, even in the absence of a petition for review by one of the parties, the Court independently reviews the matter and issues its final order in the case.

#### **H. Final Orders of Discipline**

The conclusion of a lawyer discipline proceeding is an order from the Supreme Court setting out the facts of the case, determining the violations (if any) of the Rules of Professional Conduct that are supported by the facts, and assessing a sanction in each case where it finds misconduct. The sanction ordered by the Court is related to the seriousness of the violation and the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The available disciplinary sanctions include:

- **Private Administrative Admonition.** A private administrative admonition is a disciplinary sanction that is issued by the Disciplinary Commission as an administrative resolution of cases involving minor misconduct. A private administrative admonition is issued as a sanction only when the Disciplinary Commission and the respondent lawyer agree to that disposition of a case. Unlike other disciplinary sanctions, the Supreme Court does not directly issue the admonition. However, the Court receives advance notice of the parties' intent to resolve a case by way of a private administrative admonition and may act within a period of 30 days to set aside such a proposed agreement. There is a public record made in the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of every case resolved by a private administrative admonition, although the facts of the matter are not included in the public record.
- **Private Reprimand.** A private reprimand consists of a private letter of reprimand from the Supreme Court to the offending lawyer. The case does not result in a publicly disseminated opinion describing the facts of the case. The Court's brief order resolving the case by way of a private reprimand is a public record that is available through the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court. In rare cases where a private reprimand is assessed, the Court may issue a *per curiam* opinion for publication styled *In the Matter of Anonymous*. While the published opinion does not identify the offending lawyer by name, the opinion sets out the facts of the case and the violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct involved for the edification of the bench, the bar and the public.
- **Public Reprimand.** A public reprimand is issued in the form of a publicly disseminated opinion or order by the Supreme Court setting forth the facts of the case



and identifying the applicable Rule violations. A public reprimand does not result in any direct limitation upon the offending lawyer's license to practice law.

- **Short Term Suspension.** The Court may assess a short-term suspension of a lawyer's license to practice law as the sanction in a case. When the term of suspension is six months or less, the lawyer's reinstatement to the practice of law is generally automatic upon the completion of the term of suspension. The Court may, and does from time to time, require that a lawyer who is suspended for a period of six months or less be reinstated to practice only after petitioning for reinstatement and proving fitness to practice law. The procedures associated with reinstatement upon petition are described later in this report. Even in cases of suspension with automatic reinstatement, for proper cause, the Disciplinary Commission may enter objections to the automatic reinstatement of the lawyer's license to practice law.
- **Long Term Suspension.** The Court may assess a longer term of suspension, which is a suspension for a period of time greater than six months. Every lawyer who is suspended for more than six months must petition the Court for reinstatement and prove fitness to re-enter the practice of law before a long-term suspension will be terminated.
- **Disbarment.** In the most serious cases of misconduct, the Court will issue a sanction of disbarment. Disbarment revokes a lawyer's license to practice law permanently, and it is not subject to being reinstated at any time in the future.

The lawyer discipline process in Indiana is not a substitute for private and other public remedies that may be available, including criminal sanctions in appropriate cases and civil liability for damages caused by lawyer negligence or other misconduct. Accordingly, the sanctions that are issued in lawyer discipline cases do not generally provide for the resolution of disputed claims of liability for money damages between the grievant and the offending lawyer. However, a suspended lawyer's willingness to make restitution may be considered by the Court to be a substantial factor in determining whether or not the lawyer will be reinstated to the practice of law at the conclusion of a term of suspension.

From time to time, the Court includes in a sanction order additional provisions that address aspects of the lawyer's misconduct in the particular case. Examples of these conditions include participation in substance abuse or mental health recovery programs, specific continuing legal education requirements, and periodic audits of trust accounts.

#### **I. Resolution By Agreement**

In cases of minor misconduct, if the Disciplinary Commission and the respondent lawyer agree before the filing of a formal complaint charging misconduct, a case may be disposed of by way of the issuance of a private administrative admonition. Unlike other disciplinary sanctions, this is an administrative sanction that is issued by the Disciplinary Commission rather than by the Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court does receive notice of a proposed administrative admonition and may act to set it aside.

In some cases that have resulted in the filing of a formal complaint charging misconduct, the respondent lawyer and the Disciplinary Commission are able to reach an agreement concerning the facts of a case, the applicable rule violations and an appropriate sanction for the misconduct in question. In these instances, the parties submit their agreement to the Supreme Court for its consideration. Any such agreement must include an affidavit from the lawyer accepting full responsibility for the agreed misconduct. The Court is free to accept the agreement of the parties and issue a final order of discipline in conformity with the agreement, or reject the agreement if the Court does not concur with the proposed sanction.

A lawyer charged with misconduct may also tender his or her written resignation from the practice of law. A resignation is not effective unless the lawyer fully admits his or her misconduct and the Court accepts the resignation as tendered. A lawyer who has resigned with misconduct allegations pending may not seek reinstatement of his or her license until a period of at least five years has elapsed and only after successfully petitioning the Court.

In a similar manner, a lawyer charged with misconduct may fully admit the allegations and consent to such discipline as the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances.

#### **J. Temporary Suspension**

While a disciplinary complaint is pending against a lawyer, the Disciplinary Commission may seek the temporary suspension of the lawyer's license to practice law pending the outcome of the proceeding. Temporary suspensions are generally reserved for cases of serious misconduct or on-going risk to clients or the integrity of client funds. The hearing officer is responsible for taking evidence on a petition for temporary suspension and making a recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Court then issues an order granting or denying the petition for temporary suspension.

In addition to the temporary suspension procedure described above, whenever a lawyer licensed to practice law in Indiana is found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony, the Executive Secretary must report the finding of guilt to the Supreme Court and request an immediate temporary suspension from the practice of law. The Court may order the temporary suspension without a hearing, but the affected lawyer has the opportunity to submit to the Court reasons why the temporary suspension should be vacated. A temporary suspension granted under these circumstances is effective until such time as there is a resolution of related disciplinary charges or further order of the Court. Trial judges are required to send a certified copy of the order adjudicating criminal guilt of any lawyer to the Executive Secretary of the Commission within ten days of the date of the order.

Finally, the Executive Secretary is required to report to the Supreme Court any time he receives notice that a lawyer has been found to be delinquent in the payment of child support as a result of an intentional violation of a support order. After being given an opportunity to respond, the Supreme Court may suspend the lawyer's license to practice law until the lawyer is no longer in intentional violation of the support order.



**K. The License Reinstatement Process**

When any lawyer resigns or is suspended without provision for automatic reinstatement, the lawyer may not be reinstated into the practice of law until he or she successfully petitions the Supreme Court. The petitioning lawyer must successfully complete the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination, a standardized examination on legal ethics, prove by clear and convincing evidence that the causes of the underlying misconduct have been successfully addressed, and demonstrate that he or she is otherwise fit to re-enter the practice of law.

Lawyer reinstatement proceedings are heard in the first instance by a member of the Disciplinary Commission appointed as hearing officer by the Court, who after hearing evidence, makes a recommendation to the full Disciplinary Commission. The Disciplinary Commission, acting upon the recommendation of the hearing officer, makes its recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Court reviews the recommendation of the Disciplinary Commission and ultimately issues its order granting or denying the petition for reinstatement.

**L. Lawyer Disability Proceedings**

Any member of the public, the bar, the Disciplinary Commission, or the Executive Secretary may file with the Commission a petition alleging that a lawyer is disabled by reason of physical or mental illness or chemical dependency. The Executive Secretary is charged with investigating allegations of disability and, if justified under the circumstances, prosecuting a disability proceeding before the Disciplinary Commission or a hearing officer appointed by the Court. The Court ultimately reviews the recommendation of the Commission and may suspend the lawyer from the practice of law until such time as the disability has been remediated.

**IV. COMMISSION ACTIVITY IN 2008-2009****A. Grievances and Investigations**

An investigation into allegations of lawyer misconduct is commenced by the filing of a grievance with the Disciplinary Commission. During the reporting period, **1,456** grievances were filed with the Disciplinary Commission. Of this number, the Disciplinary Commission initiated **53** grievances. The total number of grievances filed was about one-hundred less than the number filed the previous year. **Appendix B** presents in graphical form the number of grievances filed for each of the past ten years.

There were **17,187** Indiana lawyers in active, good-standing status and **2,755** lawyers in inactive, good-standing as of June 30, 2009. In addition, **1,245** lawyers regularly admitted to practice in other jurisdictions were granted temporary admission to practice law by trial court orders in specific cases during the year, pursuant to the provisions of Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 3. The total grievances filed represent **8.47** grievances for every one-hundred actively practicing lawyers. **Appendix C** presents in graphical form the grievance rate for each of the past ten years.

Distribution of grievances is not even. Far fewer than 1,456 separate lawyers received grievances during the reporting period, because many lawyers were the recipients of multiple

grievances. It is important to note that the mere filing of a grievance is not, in and of itself, an indication of misconduct on the part of a lawyer.

During the reporting period, 949 of the grievances received were dismissed without further investigation upon a determination that, on their face, they presented no substantial question of misconduct.

Upon receipt, each grievance that is not initially dismissed is classified according to the type of legal matter out of which the grievance arose and the type of misconduct alleged by the grievant. The table in **Appendix D** sets forth the classification by legal matter and by misconduct alleged of all grievances that were pending on June 30, 2009, or that were dismissed during the reporting year after investigation. Many grievances arise out of more than one type of legal matter or present claims of more than one type of alleged misconduct. Accordingly, the total numbers presented in Appendix D represent a smaller number of actual grievances.

Ranked in order of complaint frequency, the legal matters most often giving rise to grievances involve *Criminal, Domestic Relations, Tort, Personal Misconduct, Bankruptcy and Contract*. To understand the significance of this data, it is important to keep in mind that criminal cases make up the largest single category of cases filed in our trial courts. With the exception of civil plenary filings, domestic relations cases account for the next highest category of cases filed. Thus, in part, the high rates of grievances filed that pertain to criminal and domestic relations matters reflect the high number of cases of those types handled by lawyers in Indiana. The predominant types of legal matters out of which grievances arose during the reporting period are presented graphically in **Appendix E**.

Ranked in order of complaint frequency, the alleged misconduct types most often giving rise to grievances are *Poor Communications or Non-Diligence, Improper Withdrawal, Not Acting With Competence, Exercising Improper Influence, Misinforming, Excessive Fees and Conflicts of Interest*, with complaints about poor communications or non-diligence being close to twice as frequent as the next category of alleged misconduct. The predominant types of misconduct alleged in grievances during the reporting period are presented graphically in **Appendix F**.

The following is the status of all grievances that were pending before the Disciplinary Commission on June 30, 2009, or that had been dismissed during the reporting period:

	<u>DISMISSED</u>	<u>OPEN</u>
Grievances filed before July 1, 2008	337	441
Grievances filed on or after July 1, 2008	1,173	283
Total carried over from preceding year:		938
Total carried over to next year:		724

This represents a reduction of more than 200 files in the number of grievances carried over into the following year

## **B. Non-Cooperation**

A lawyer's law license may be suspended if the lawyer has failed to cooperate with the disciplinary process. The purpose of this is to promote lawyer cooperation to aid in the effective

and efficient functioning of the disciplinary system. The Commission brings allegations of non-cooperation before the Court by filing petitions to show cause. During the reporting year, the Disciplinary Commission filed 23 petitions to suspend the law licenses of 19 lawyers with the Supreme Court for failing to cooperate with investigations. The following are the dispositions of the non-cooperation matters that the Commission filed with the Court during the reporting year or that were carried over from the prior year:

**Show cause petitions filed.....23**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
Barrett, Timothy D.	Spring Lake, MI	October 20, 2006
Beach, Steven A., Jr.	Anderson	May 20, 2005
Bowlin, Jimmie, D., Jr.	Crawfordsville	October 25, 1991
Corbin, Timothy L.	Indianapolis	October 31, 1994
Crotty, Brien P.	South Bend	November 9, 1998
Denney, Louis W.	Anderson	October 9, 1978
Doyle, Timothy A.	Indianapolis	December 21, 1999
Doyle, Timothy A.	Indianapolis	December 21, 1999
Engbretsen, Kjell P.	Lebanon	January 7, 2005
Engbretsen, Kjell P.	Lebanon	January 7, 2005
Gantz, D. Charles	Greenwood	September 22, 1971
Gifford, Ronald D.	Plymouth	October 13, 1976
Harris, Ronald D.	Jeffersonville	October 9, 1981
Harshey, Kenneth A.	Indianapolis	May 26, 1999
Kauffman, Gregory P.	Elkhart	January 23, 2001
Kias, Michael J.	Greenwood	September 19, 1962
Kilburn, James R.	Austin	October 9, 1981
Moore, Thomas C., II	Indianapolis	October 10, 1986
Moore, Thomas C., II	Indianapolis	October 10, 1986
Rawls, William J.	Indianapolis	October 18, 1985
Zakrzewski, Daniel M.	New Carlisle	June 1, 1984
Zirkle, Frederick Anthony	Crown Point	November 3, 1997
Zirkle, Frederick Anthony	Crown Point	November 3, 1997

**Dismissed as moot after cooperation before show cause order .....1**

Kauffman, Gregory P.

**Petition pending on June 30, 2009, without show cause order .....0**

**Show cause orders with no suspension .....24**

**Dismissed after show cause order due to compliance .....15**

Beach, Steven A., Jr.  
 Burch, Mark A. (from prior year)  
 Burch, Mark A. (from prior year)  
 Clark, Andrew E.

Denney, Louis W.  
 Doyle, Timothy A.  
 Doyle, Timothy A.  
 Doyle, Timothy A. (from prior year)  
 Engebretsen, Kjell P.  
 Gantz, D. Charles  
 Gifford, Ronald D.  
 Kilburn, James R.  
 Moore, Thomas C., II  
 Rawls, William J.  
 Zirkle, Frederick Anthony

Dismissed due to disbarment, resignation or suspension.....7

Burch, Mark A. (from prior year)  
 Burch, Mark A. (from prior year)  
 Burkett, Bradley K. (from prior year)  
 Harshey, Kenneth A.  
 Powell, Kimberly O. (from prior year)  
 Powell, Kimberly O. (from prior year)  
 Roberts, Robert E. (from prior year)

Show cause orders pending on June 30, 2009 .....2

Moore, Thomas C., II  
 Zirkle, Frederick Anthony

#### **Suspensions for non-cooperation.....9**

Non-cooperation Suspensions still in effect on June 30, 2009 .....5

Barrett, Timothy D.  
 Corbin, Timothy L.  
 Crotty, Brien P.  
 Harris, Ronald D.  
 Zakrzewski, Daniel M.

Reinstated due to cooperation after suspension .....4

Bowlin, Jimmie D., Jr.  
 Engebretsen, Kjell P.  
 Kelly, Daniel S. (from prior year petition)  
 Kilburn, James R. (from prior year petition)

#### **Non-Cooperation Suspensions Converted to Indefinite Suspensions .....8**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
Burkett, Bradley K. (from prior year petition)	Portland	January 24, 1984
Harshey, Kenneth J. (from prior year petition)	Indianapolis	May 26, 1999
Johnson, Theodore J. (from prior year petition)	Valparaiso	October 22, 1993

Johnson, Theodore J. (from prior year petition)	Valparaiso	October 22, 1993
Johnson, Theodore J. (from prior year petition)	Valparaiso	October 22, 1993
Kias, Michael J.	Greenwood	September 19, 1962
Molin, Emil J. (from prior year petition)	Tucson, AZ	October 14, 1988
Smith, Michael J.	Wabash	October 8, 1993

### C. Trust Account Overdraft Reporting

Pursuant to Admis.Disc.R. 23, section 29, all Indiana lawyers must maintain their client trust accounts in financial institutions that have agreed to report any trust account overdrafts to the Disciplinary Commission. Upon receipt of a trust account overdraft report, the Disciplinary Commission sends an inquiry letter to the lawyer directing that the lawyer supply a documented, written explanation for the overdraft. After review of the circumstances surrounding the overdraft, the investigation is either closed or referred to the Disciplinary Commission for consideration of filing a disciplinary grievance.

The results of inquiries into overdraft reports received during the reporting year are:

Inquiries Carried Over From Prior Year .....	36
Overdraft Reports Received In Current Year .....	125
Inquiries Closed In Current Year .....	130
<b>Reasons for Closing:</b>	
Bank Error .....	37
Deposit of Trust Funds to Wrong Trust Account .....	2
Disbursement from Trust Before Deposited Funds Collected .....	16
Referral for Disciplinary Investigation .....	12
Disbursement from Trust Before Trust Funds Deposited .....	17
Overdraft Due to Bank Charges Assessed Against Account .....	2
Inadvertent Deposit of Trust Funds to Non-Trust Account .....	9
Overdraft Due to Refused Deposit for Bad Endorsement .....	3
Law Office Math or Record-Keeping Error .....	22
Death, Disbarment or Resignation of Lawyer .....	1
Inadvertent Disbursement of Operating Obligation From Trust .....	6
Non-Trust Account Inadvertently Misidentified as Trust Account .....	2
Fraudulent Office Staff Conduct .....	1
Inquiries Carried Over Into Following Year .....	31

### D. Litigation

#### 1. Overview

In 2008-2009, the Commission filed 62 Verified Complaints for Disciplinary Action with the Supreme Court, fifteen more than in the previous year. These Verified Complaints, together with amendments to pending Verified Complaints, represented findings of reasonable cause by the Commission in 81 separate counts of misconduct during the reporting year.

Including two dismissals and one finding for the respondent, in 2008-2009, the Supreme Court issued 74 final dispositive orders, compared to 53 in the previous year, representing the completion of 110 separate discipline files compared to the completion of 66 discipline files by court order in the previous year. Including six private administrative admonitions, 76 unique

lawyers received final discipline in the reporting year, compared to 61 in the previous year. **Appendix G** provides a comparison of disciplinary sanctions entered for each of the past ten years.

## **2. Verified Complaints for Disciplinary Action**

### **a. Status of Verified Complaints Filed During the Reporting Period**

The following reports the status of all new verified complaints filed during the reporting period:

Verified Complaints Filed During Reporting Period.....	62
Number Disposed Of By End of Year .....	20
Number Pending At End of Year .....	45

In addition, the Disciplinary Commission authorized the filing of **10** verified complaints during the reporting period that had not yet been filed by June 30, 2009.

The Commission also filed **5** Notices of Foreign Discipline and Requests for Reciprocal Discipline with the Supreme Court pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23, §28(b).

During the reporting year, the Disciplinary Commission filed Notices of Felony Guilty Findings and Requests for Suspension pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Sec. 11.1(a) in 7 cases.

### **b. Status of All Pending Verified Complaints**

The following reports the status of all formal disciplinary proceedings pending as of June 30, 2009:

Cases Filed; Appointment of Hearing Officer Pending .....	7
Cases Pending Before Hearing Officers .....	30
Cases Pending On Review Before the Supreme Court.....	<u>5</u>
Total Verified Complaints Pending on June 30, 2009 .....	42

Of cases decided during the reporting year, **8** were tried on the merits to hearing officers at final hearings, **45** cases were submitted to the Supreme Court for resolution by way of Affidavit for Resignation, Conditional Agreement for Discipline or Consent to Discipline, and **5** cases was submitted by hearing officer findings on an Application for Judgment on the Complaint.

## **3. Final Dispositions**

During the reporting period, the Disciplinary Commission imposed administrative sanctions and the Supreme Court imposed disciplinary sanctions, made reinstatement determinations, or took other actions as follows:

Dismissals of Verified Complaint .....	2
Findings for Respondent on Merits.....	1
Private Administrative Admonitions .....	6
Private Reprimands .....	4



**Public Reprimands.....24**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
Benkie, Scott A.	Indianapolis	October 18, 1985
Brewer, Tia R.	Marion	January 6, 2004
Burns, Leo T., Jr.	Logansport	May 30, 1986
Campiti, Vincent M.	South Bend	November 3, 1997
Collins, David A.	Bloomington	October 16, 1987
Cook, Gary A.	Kokomo	December 11, 1998
Crawford, Douglas A.	Indianapolis	October 10, 1986
Denmure, Douglas R.	Aurora	May 18, 1966
Drake, MacArthur	Gary	May 5, 1976
Edwards, Antonio P.	Martinsville	May 19, 2003
Eslinger, Stephen L.	South Bend	May 30, 1980
Grubbs, Robert A.	Fort Wayne	October 18, 2004
Hagedorn, Michael H.	Tell City	October 9, 1974
Kahre, Gregory A.	Evansville	October 12, 1978
Litz, Steven C.	Monrovia	October 12, 1984
Loomis, J. Michael	Fort Wayne	June 4, 1982
Marshall, Kevin W.	Hobart	June 8, 1987
Miller, Roger L.	Frankfort	May 17, 1967
Price, Jeffry G.	Peru	October 10, 1973
Rader, Carolyn W.	Indianapolis	May 29, 1981
Smith, C. Jerome	Hammond	December 4, 1957
Toland, Shane A.	Indianapolis	June 18, 2001
Warr, Alistair J.	Indianapolis	June 7, 1991
Wray, Robert J.	Fort Wayne	January 21, 1980

**Suspensions With Automatic Reinstatement.....4**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>	<u>Suspension</u>
Baylor, Paul E.	Anderson	November 9, 1998	30 days
Blaising, Thomas R.	Battle Creek, MI	May 1, 1974	215 days
Doyle, Ricky D.	Greenwood	June 9, 1991	30 days
Shaw, Douglas L.	Schererville	May 12, 2006	30 days

**Suspensions With Reinstatement on Conditions.....13**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>	<u>Suspension</u>
Boyd, Elaine P.	Indianapolis	October 10, 1980	90 days <sup>1</sup>
Bryan, Lon D.	Muncie	June 9, 1989	1 year <sup>2</sup>
Butsch, David R.	Connersville	October 4, 1979	6 months <sup>3</sup>
Earls, William W.	Terre Haute	November 4, 1996	180 days <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 90-day suspension, all stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 1 year.<sup>2</sup> 1 year suspension, all stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 2 years.<sup>3</sup> 6-month suspension, 4 months stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 36 months.<sup>4</sup> 180-day suspension, all stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 24 months.

Falls, Margaret S.	Fort Wayne	October 18, 1985	90 days <sup>5</sup>
Followell, Douglas S.	Sullivan	May 1, 1974	180 days <sup>6</sup>
Green, James R.	Greenwood	October 9, 1974	90 days <sup>7</sup>
Holbrook, Neil E.	South Bend	October 7, 1983	6 months <sup>8</sup>
Katic, Peter	Munster	October 11, 1977	180 days <sup>9</sup>
Spielman, Kim H.	Fort Wayne	June 8, 1987	30 days <sup>10</sup>
Stites, Michael G.	Rockville	November 8, 2002	6 months <sup>11</sup>
Tolliver, Jason W.	Indianapolis	November 19, 2001	180 days <sup>12</sup>
Woods, Alexa L.	Indianapolis	November 8, 1999	120 days <sup>13</sup>

<sup>5</sup> 90 day suspension, all stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 24 months.

<sup>6</sup> 180-day suspension, 150 days stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 36 months.

<sup>7</sup> 90-day suspension, all stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 2 years.

<sup>8</sup> 6-month suspension, 2 months stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 18 months.

<sup>9</sup> 180-day suspension, 120 days stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 30 months.

<sup>10</sup> 30-day suspension, all stayed, conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 1 year.

<sup>11</sup> 6-month suspension, 2 months stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 36 months.

<sup>12</sup> 180-day suspension, all stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 30 months.

<sup>13</sup> 120-day suspension, all stayed conditioned on compliance with terms of probation for 30 months.

#### **Suspensions Without Automatic Reinstatement.....19**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>	<u>Suspension</u>
Beach, Steven A., Jr.	Anderson	May 20, 2005	90 days
Buehner, Constance L. Runner	Louisville, KY	October 15, 1990	Indefinite <sup>1</sup>
Burkett, Bradley K.	Portland	January 24, 1984	Indefinite
Evans, Fara P.	Pittsburgh, PA	October 20, 1989	2 years
Forbush-Moss, Bethanni E.	Louisville, KY	May 30, 2000	Indefinite <sup>2</sup>
Gifford, Ronald Dean	Plymouth	October 13, 1986	9 months
Graham, Craig W.	Jeffersonville	June 12, 1992	90 days
Harshey, Kenneth A.	Indianapolis	May 26, 1999	Indefinite
Jackel, Katherine E.	Ann Arbor, MI	November 3, 1997	2 years
Jarrett, Ray W.	Brazil	May 19, 2003	90 days
Johnson, Theodore J.	Valparaiso	October 22, 1993	Indefinite
Johnson, Theodore J.	Valparaiso	October 22, 1993	Indefinite
Johnson, Theodore J.	Valparaiso	October 22, 1993	Indefinite
Kias, Michael J.	Greenwood	September 19, 1962	Indefinite
Laterzo, Marc C.	Gary	October 22, 1999	180 days
Rosales, Leigia R.	Indianapolis	June 9, 2000	2 years
Molin, Emil J.	Tucson, AZ	October 14, 1988	Indefinite
Patheja, Jaipal	Valparaiso	December 29, 1997	6 months
Smith, Michael J.	Wabash	October 8, 1993	Indefinite

<sup>1</sup> Not eligible to seek reinstatement until readmitted in Kentucky.

<sup>2</sup> Not eligible to seek reinstatement until readmitted in Kentucky.



**Accepted Resignations .....4**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
Crabtree, William G., II	Schererville	October 25, 1991
Collesano, Stanley F.	Indianapolis	June 4, 1999
Auger-Marchand, Ruben	Indianapolis	June 9, 2000
Kauffman, Gregory P.	Elkhart	January 23, 2001

**Disbarments.....3**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
Powell, Kimberly O.	Indianapolis	May 19, 2003
Lehman, Robert E.	Indianapolis	May 31, 1977
Ucherek, David M.	Chicago, IL	December 29, 1997

**Reinstatement Proceedings**

Disposed of by Final Order .....6

Granted ..... 4

Cloyd, Casey D., Indianapolis (w/ 2 years probation)  
 Scott, Vincent L., Carmel  
 Rayle, Merrick Scott, Pacific Grove, CA  
 Webb, Scott L., Anderson

Denied ..... 1

McLin, William C., Indianapolis

Petition Withdrawn..... 1

Harlowe, Stuart Clay, New Albany

**Findings of Contempt .....1**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
Patterson, Douglas W.	Evansville	June 9, 1989

**Emergency Interim Suspension .....0****Temporary Suspensions (Guilty of Felony).....7**

<u>Name</u>	<u>City of Practice</u>	<u>Date of Admission</u>
Auger-Marchand, Ruben	Indianapolis	June 9, 2000
Lehman, Robert E.	Indianapolis	May 31, 1977
Recker, James R., II	Indianapolis	November 3, 1997
Record, Terry J.	Indianapolis	October 20, 2006
Riga, Deborah A.	Schererville	September 28, 1993
Snyder, Ryan W.	Indianapolis	September 26, 2005
Wallingford, Anthony J.	New Albany	October 23, 1995

**V. SUMMARY OF DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION ACTIVITIES**

	2008-09	2007-08	2006-07	2005-06	2004-05
Matters Completed	1,456	1,541	1,463	1,599	1,692
Complaints Filed	62	47	34	42	41
Final Hearings	8	12	10	15	8
Final Orders	74	53	60	52	60
Reinstatement Petitions Filed	4	5	11	8	4
Reinstatement Hearings	5	6	6	3	4
Reinstatements Ordered	3	9	1	1	4
Reinstatements Deny/Dismiss	2	3	7	2	2
Income	\$1,715,474	\$1,765,488	\$1,984,450	\$1,870,208	\$1,785,247
Expenses	\$1,915,389	\$1,706,111	\$1,814,736	\$1,766,748	\$1,629,153

**VI. AMENDMENTS TO RULES AFFECTING LAWYER DISCIPLINE****A. Admission and Discipline Rules****Admission and Discipline Rule 3**

On September 9, 2008, effective January 1, 2009, the Supreme Court amended Admis. Disc. R. 3, dealing with temporary admission of out-of-state lawyers, i.e., *pro hac vice* admissions. When an out-of-state lawyer is temporarily admitted, admission must be renewed by payment of an annual fee in January of each calendar year that participation in the matter continues. Failure to renew results in automatic exclusion of the foreign lawyer from practice in Indiana, after which reinstatement is upon petition to the Supreme Court. The amendment to Admis. Disc. R. 3(f)(2) implements a late fee for lawyers who are automatically excluded for failure to timely pay the annual renewal fee (currently \$115). The amount of the late fee is \$115.

**Admission and Discipline Rule 23**

On September 9, 2008, effective January 1, 2009, the Supreme Court amended Admis. Disc. R. 23, section 27, to make some clarifications to the section dealing with surrogate attorneys. It amended section 27(b)(2) to indicate that lawyers who practice in "fiduciary entities" (in effect, law firms) are required to designate an attorney surrogate. They were previously "deemed" to have appointed their firms as the attorney surrogates. With this amendment, lawyers who practice in firms must designate their firms as their attorney surrogate designees in the designated place on the annual attorney registration statement.

**B. Rules of Professional Conduct**

The Supreme Court made no changes to the professional conduct rules in the reporting year.

#### **VII. OTHER DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION ACTIVITIES**

Members of the Disciplinary Commission and its staff spent many hours during the reporting year engaged in education efforts related to the lawyer discipline process and professional responsibility. Some of those activities are highlighted in **Appendix H**.

#### **VIII. FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION**

A report setting forth the financial condition of the Disciplinary Commission Fund is attached as **Appendix I**.

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## **IX. APPENDICES**

## BIOGRAPHIES OF DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION MEMBERS

**Fred Austerman** is from Wayne County, Indiana. He is one of two non-lawyer members of the Disciplinary Commission. He is the President and CEO of Optical Disc Solutions, Inc. in Richmond, a company that provides DVD and compact disc replicating services and project management for a wide variety of media developers. Mr. Austerman attended Indiana University East and graduated from Indiana University/Purdue University in Indianapolis in 1983 receiving an undergraduate degree in business, specializing in accounting. He is married and has twin sons. He is serving his first five-year term on the Disciplinary Commission, ending on June 30, 2008, and served as Secretary of the Commission during this year.

**Diane L. (Wolf) Bender** is a sole practitioner in Evansville, Indiana. She received a B.B.A. degree, with highest honors, from the University of Notre Dame in 1977. She received her law degree, cum laude, from the Notre Dame Law School in 1980. Ms. Bender was admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana in 1980 and is also admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana and the Supreme Court of the United States. She is a member of the Evansville Bar, Indiana State Bar, and American Bar Associations. She served as president of the Evansville Bar Association in 1992 and was recipient of the Evansville Bar Association's James Bethel Gresham Freedom Award in 1991. She served as Chair of the Probate, Trust and Real Property Section of the Indiana State Bar Association in 1996. Ms. Bender is a Fellow of the Indiana Bar Foundation and a Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. She was initially appointed to a five-year term on the Disciplinary Commission effective July 1, 1999 and was reappointed to a second term expiring on June 30, 2009. She has previously served as Secretary, Vice-Chair and Chair of the Commission.

**Corinne R. Finnerty**, a Jennings County native, practices law in the partnership of McConnell Finnerty Waggoner PC in North Vernon. She received her undergraduate degree from Indiana University in Bloomington. In 1981, she graduated magna cum laude from Indiana University School of Law in Bloomington, where she was selected for membership in the Order of the Coif. She was admitted to practice law in Indiana that same year. She is also admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana. Her bar association memberships include the Jennings County Bar Association, of which she is a past president, the Indiana State Bar Association, and the American Bar Association. Other professional memberships include the Indiana Bar Foundation, of which she is a Patron Fellow, the Indiana Trial Lawyers Association, and the American Association for Justice. Ms. Finnerty has previously been employed as Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Jennings County and the city attorney for North Vernon. In 1993, she was selected as one of forty-three outstanding women in the law at the annual meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association. Effective July 1, 2003, she was appointed by the Indiana Supreme Court to serve a five-year term on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission. Ms. Finnerty served as Vice-Chair of the Disciplinary Commission during this reporting year, having previously served as Secretary.

**Maureen I. Grinsfelder**, a native of Whitley County, retired on January 1, 2009 after fourteen years as Executive Director of the Questa Foundation for Education, Inc., a non-profit foundation that helps finance college for Allen County students. She is a graduate of the University of Michigan, where she was selected for membership in Scroll and Wyvern women's honor societies. For twenty-two years, she was employed by NBD Bank, NA and its predecessor banks

## APPENDIX A

in Fort Wayne, administering trusts, guardianships and estates. She was appointed to the Board of Trustees of the Indiana State Museum and Memorials and has served numerous boards of social service and arts organizations in Fort Wayne. She is a past president of Congregation Achduth Vesholom in Fort Wayne and a past vice-president of the Union for Reform Judaism Northeast Lakes Regional Council. She and her husband, Alan Grinsfelder, have four sons and nine grandchildren. She is serving her first five-year term on the Disciplinary Commission, which will expire on June 30, 2010.

**Robert L. Lewis** is a member of the three-person law firm of Robert L. Lewis & Associates, in Gary, Indiana. Two other attorneys in the office are of counsel. He attended Indiana University in Bloomington where he received his B.A. in 1970 and his law degree in 1973. He also obtained a Masters in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University in 1980. He is a retired JAG Corps Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves with prior active duty service in Viet Nam as a U.S. Marine. He is admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Northern and Southern U.S. District Courts of Indiana, and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. He is also a member of the Indiana and Kentucky Bars. He served as a part-time public defender in the Lake Superior Court, Criminal Division, for nine years before becoming a Magistrate in the same Superior Court system. He served there for four years and is currently a civil referee in the Gary City Court. He is a life member of the NAACP, Phi Alpha Delta Legal Fraternity, Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, Indiana University Alumni Association and the U.S. Reserve Officer's Association. Mr. Lewis is also a member of the American Bar Association, National Bar Association, Indiana State Bar Association, Lake County Bar Association, the James Kimbrough Bar Association, and the American and Indiana Trial Lawyers Associations. He was commissioned a Kentucky Colonel by former Kentucky Governor Julian Carroll. He was initially appointed to a five-year term on the Disciplinary Commission effective July 1, 1999, and was reappointed to a second term expiring June 30, 2009. He has previously served as Secretary, Vice-Chair and Chair of the Disciplinary Commission.

**R. Anthony Prather** is a partner in the Indianapolis office of Barnes & Thornburg LLP. He represents management interests exclusively in both labor and employment law and litigation matters in state courts and federal courts, including charges of employment discrimination. He handles matters that include alternative dispute resolution, discovery, bench and jury trials, and appeals. He also advises employers on various employment laws. Prior to joining Barnes & Thornburg, Mr. Prather was in-house counsel for Ameritech Corporation, Firestone Building Products Company, Firestone Industrial Products Company, and Firestone Polymers. Additionally, Mr. Prather served as the media relations spokesperson for Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., in all federal class action and personal injury litigation against Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. consolidated before Judge Sarah Evans Barker, and Ford Motor Company in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Mr. Prather received his B.A. from Indiana University in 1980 and his J.D. from Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington in 1983. He is admitted to practice before the U.S. District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He is a member of the American Corporate Counsel Association, the Indiana State Bar Association, and the National Bar Association. He was appointed to a five-year term on the Disciplinary Commission effective July 1, 2004.

#### APPENDIX A

**J. Mark Robinson** is the managing attorney of the New Albany office of Indiana Legal Services, Inc. He received his B.S. in Civil Engineering from Purdue University in 1969, his law degree from the University of Louisville School of Law in 1973, and a Master of Divinity from the Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary in 1974. He was admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of Kentucky in 1974, the State of Indiana in 1975, and the United States District Courts for the Southern District of Indiana and the Western District of Kentucky. Mr. Robinson has served as in-house counsel to Chemetron Corporation, a staff attorney for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and has spent the past twenty-nine years with Indiana Legal Services. His professional memberships include the Clark and Floyd County Bar Associations; the Indiana State, Kentucky, and American Bar Associations. He is the current president of the Clark County Bar Association, past president of the Clark County Board of Public Defenders, has served Clark County in the Indiana State Bar Association House of Delegates for the past ten years, and has served on the Indiana State Bar Association Board of Governors (2004-2006). He is also a Master Fellow of the Indiana Bar Foundation and present member of its board of directors. He was appointed a Sagamore of the Wabash in 1999. In his civic life, he serves as President of the Board of Directors of the River Ridge Development Authority, and is past trustee of the Southern Indiana Economic Development Council. As a Presbyterian minister, Mr. Robinson served small rural parishes in southeastern Indiana for thirty-two years. He served for six years on the Indiana Pro Bono Commission, and was appointed to a five-year term as a member of the Disciplinary Commission that expired on June 30, 2006. He was re-appointed to a second term on the Commission beginning July 1, 2006. He has previously served as Secretary, Vice-Chair and Chair of the Disciplinary Commission.

**Anthony M. Zappia** is the senior member of the 4-person law firm of Zappia Zappia & Stipp, located in South Bend, Indiana. He attended the University of Notre Dame where he received his B.A. in 1972, cum laude, in the School of Economics, and earned his law degree in 1976 from Valparaiso University. He is admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Indiana and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Mr. Zappia was a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in St. Joseph County from 1976 to 1986. He was also the attorney for the Mishawaka City Council from 1981 to 1986. He has served St. Joseph County as its County Attorney from 1986 until the present. He has been a member of the St. Joseph County Judicial Nominating Committee on two separate occasions, and presently serves on the St. Joseph County Public Defender's Advisory Committee, and is a member of the Indiana Supreme Court Committee on Character and Fitness. Mr. Zappia was President-Elect in 1989-1990 and President in 1990-1991 of the St. Joseph County Bar Association. He is a member of the Indiana State and American Bar Associations, Indiana Trial Lawyers Association, and Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Mr. Zappia's principal areas of practice are personal injury, criminal defense, domestic relations and civil litigation. He was appointed to an initial five-year term on the Disciplinary Commission that expired on June 30, 2006, and was reappointed to a second term beginning July 1, 2006. He is a former Chair, Vice-Chair and Secretary of the Disciplinary Commission.

**Sally Franklin Zweig** is a partner of the law firm of Katz & Korin P.C. in Indianapolis. She obtained her undergraduate degree from Washington University in St. Louis in 1971 and received her law degree from Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis in 1986 and was admitted to practice that same year. Prior to her current affiliation she was a partner at Johnson Smith LLP where she chaired the Health Care Practice Group. She is admitted to practice in all Indiana state courts and both Indiana federal court districts, as well as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals


#### APPENDIX A

and the Supreme Court of the United States. Ms. Zweig is a past President of the Board of Directors of the Indiana University-Indianapolis Law School Alumni Association and a past President of the Indianapolis Chapter of the American Inns of Court. She has been recognized as a Distinguished Fellow of the Indianapolis Bar Foundation and has served as a lecturer for the Bar Review presented by the Indianapolis Bar Association. She is also a Fellow of the Aspen Institute [1997] and the Oxford Center for Social Justice [1998]. Her civic service includes mayoral appointments to the Executive Board of the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee and as past co-chair of the Race Relations Leadership Counsel of Indianapolis. She also presently serves on the boards of directors of the Festival Musical Society and At Your School Services. She was appointed to a first five-year term as a member of the Disciplinary Commission expiring on June 30, 2006, and reappointed to a second term beginning July 1, 2006. A former Secretary and Vice-Chair of the Disciplinary Commission, Ms. Zweig served as Chair of the Commission in this reporting year.

#### **APPENDIX A**




### NUMBER OF GRIEVANCES FILED 1999-2009



### APPENDIX B

### GRIEVANCE RATES 1999-2009



### APPENDIX C


GRIEVANCES BY CASE TYPE AND MISCONDUCT ALLEGED (2008-2009)
--

Type of Legal Matter	Number	% of Total
Administrative Law	62	4.7%
Adoption	6	0.5%
Bankruptcy	76	5.8%
Collection	27	2.0%
Condemnation	0	0.0%
Contracts	73	5.5%
Corporate	20	1.5%
Criminal	413	31.3%
Domestic Relations	262	19.8%
Guardianship	10	0.8%
Other Judicial Action	22	1.7%
Patent, Copyright	5	0.4%
Personal Misconduct	76	5.8%
Real Estate	41	3.1%
Tort	120	9.1%
Probate	54	4.1%
Worker's Compensation	12	0.9%
Zoning	2	0.2%
Other	39	3.0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1320</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Alleged Misconduct	Number	% of Total
Action in Bad Faith	9	0.4%
Advertising	14	0.7%
Bypassing Other Attorney	16	0.8%
Communications/ Non-Diligence	607	30.2%
Conflict of Interest	98	4.9%
Conversion	47	2.3%
Disclosure of Confidences	16	0.8%
Excessive Fee	99	4.9%
Fraud	48	2.4%
Illegal Conduct	66	3.3%
Improper Influence	131	6.5%
Improper Withdrawal	346	17.2%
Incompetence	238	11.8%
Minor Disagreement	0	0.0%
Minor Fee Dispute	46	2.3%
Misinforming	108	5.4%
Overreaching	39	1.9%
Personal Misconduct	78	3.9%
Solicitation	5	0.2%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>100.0%</b>


APPENDIX D

# GRIEVANCES BY CASE TYPE 2008-2009




## APPENDIX E

**GRIEVANCES BY MISCONDUCT ALLEGED 2008-2009**



**APPENDIX F**

# **SANCTIONS ORDERED 1999-2009**



## **APPENDIX G**

**PUBLIC AND BAR IMPROVEMENT AND EDUCATION ACTIVITIES  
2008-2009**

Author	<i>How Unappealing: Ethics Issues In Appointed Appellate Representation</i> , Vol. 52, No. 1 RES GESTAE 37 (July/August 2008)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Trust Accounts in a Time of Bank Failures</i> , Vol. 52, No. 2 RES GESTAE 33 (September 2008)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Divided Duty: Reporting Misconduct (Part I)</i> , Vol. 52, No. 3 RES GESTAE 29 (October 2008)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Divided Duty: Reporting Misconduct (Part II)</i> , Vol. 52, No. 4 RES GESTAE 36 (November 2008)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Warning! Scam Artists At Work</i> , Vol. 52, No. 5 RES GESTAE 21 (December 2008)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Top Ten 2008 Professional Responsibility Stories</i> , Vol. 52, No. 6 RES GESTAE 23 (January/February 2009)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Dancin' With Them What Brung Ya: Electing Appellate Judges</i> , Vol. 52, No. 7 RES GESTAE 31 (March 2009)	Lundberg
Author	<i>What's In Your Trust Account? When Clients Pay By Credit Card</i> , Vol. 52, No. 8 RES GESTAE 26 (April 2009)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Sex and Intimacy: Emotional Entanglements With Clients</i> , Vol. 52, No. 9 RES GESTAE 33 (May 2009)	Lundberg
Author	<i>Will You Take Fries For That? Bartering for Legal Services</i> , Vol. 52, No. 10 RES GESTAE 32 (June 2009)	Lundberg
Author	<i>2008 Survey of the Law of Professional Responsibility</i> , 42 INDIANA LAW REVIEW (2009)	Kidd
JUL 25, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics in Workers Compensation Cases," Indiana Trial Lawyers Association, Indianapolis	Kidd
JUL 30, 2008	Panelist: State Lawyer Discipline Counsel Panel, Professional Responsibility Officers' Conference, U.S. Department of Justice, National Advocacy Center, Columbia, SC	Lundberg
AUG 6, 2008	Panelist: "Use and Abuse of an Ethics Expert in Disciplinary Proceedings," Annual Meeting, National Organization of Bar Counsel, New York, NY	Lundberg
AUG 14, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics for Neutrals," School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indianapolis	Kidd
AUG 19, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics for Neutrals," Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis	Kidd
AUG 20, 2008	Presenter: "Ethical Issues for Paralegals," Indiana Paralegal Association, Indianapolis	Kidd
AUG 21, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Legal Ethics Issues for 2008 and Beyond," Fulton County Bar Association, Rochester	Lundberg

**APPENDIX H**

AUG 22, 2008	Presenter: "Update on Ethics Cases," Indiana Trial Lawyers Assoc. Women's Seminar, Indianapolis	Kidd
SEP 9, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Professional Responsibility," Annual Law Update, Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Lundberg
SEP 18, 2008	Presenter: "Avoiding Trouble in the First Place," Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN	Iosue
SEP 25, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Vignettes of Legal Ethics," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, South Bend	Kidd
SEP 27, 2008	Guest Lecturer, Civil Practice Clinic, Prof. Wolf, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis	Lundberg
OCT 2, 2008	Panelist: "Ethics in Problem Solving Courts," Indiana Judicial Center, Indianapolis	Pruden
OCT 3, 2008	Presenter: "Ethical Concerns for Business Lawyers," Annual Mtg., Indiana State Bar Association, Indianapolis	Kidd
OCT 6, 2008	Presenter: "Legal Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor," U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Indiana, South Bend	Lundberg
OCT 6, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics Update," Evansville Bar Association, Evansville	Pruden
OCT 8, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Vignettes of Legal Ethics," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Kidd
OCT 10, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics Review for Bankruptcy Trustees," Indianapolis	Pruden
OCT 13, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics for Family Law Practitioners," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Kidd
OCT 16, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Legal Malpractice and Grievances: Understanding the Causes of Malpractice," Family Law Institute, Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Lundberg
OCT 17, 2008	Presenter: "Attorney Surrogates," Indiana Public Defender Council, Indianapolis	Rice
OCT 17, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Ethics Issues in Federal Criminal Defense," North Dist. Public Defenders Office, Plymouth	Kidd
OCT 21, 2008	Co-Presenter, "Time Mastery for Lawyers," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Lundberg
OCT 28, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics: Listen, Do You Want to Know a Secret?," Advanced Appellate Skills, Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Lundberg
OCT 29, 2008	Presenter: "Ethical Issues for Business Lawyers," Business Law Section, Lake County Bar Association, Merrillville	Lundberg
NOV 3, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Legal Advertising Ethics Webinar," Law & Politics, Indianapolis	Kidd
NOV 5, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Vignettes of Legal Ethics," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Terre Haute	Kidd
NOV 6, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Vignettes of Legal Ethics," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Evansville	Kidd

#### APPENDIX H



NOV 12, 2008	Presenter: "Ethical Issues, Ex Parte and Bypass Communications," Annual Real Estate Institute, Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum	McKinney
NOV 14, 2008	Presenter: "Recent Developments in Conflicts of Interest, Trust Accounting and Attorney Fees," 14 <sup>th</sup> Annual CLE Program, Boone Circuit Court/Boone County Bar Association, Lebanon	Lundberg
NOV 21, 2008	Presenter: "Trust Accounts," Applied Professionalism, Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Lundberg
NOV 21, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Vignettes of Legal Ethics," Applied Professionalism Course, Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum Indianapolis	Pruden
DEC 1, 2008	Presenter: "Ethical Issues for Government Attorneys," Legal & Ethics Conference, Office of Inspector General and State Ethics Commission, Indianapolis	Lundberg
DEC 2, 2008	Presenter: "Ethics in Family Law Matters," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Kidd
DEC 4, 2008	Co-Presenter: "Ethics Year In Review," Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Indianapolis	Kidd
DEC 5, 2008	Co-Presenter: "First Amendment Rights of Lawyers," American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana, Indianapolis	Lundberg
DEC 5, 2008	Presenter: "Unbundling Legal Services," Heartland Pro Bono Services, Franklin, Indiana	Iosue
DEC 9, 2008	Presenter: "Trust Account Management," Applied Professionalism Course, Lake County Bar Association, Merrillville	Pruden
DEC 10, 2008	Presenter: "Conflicts of Interest 101: A Flyover from 30,000 Feet", Marion County Bar Association, Indianapolis	Lundberg
DEC 12, 2008	Presenter: "Disciplinary Process," Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN	Iosue
JAN 8, 2009	Presenter: "Ethics for Neutrals," Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis	Kidd
JAN 20, 2009	Presenter, "Ethics in Trial Court Practice," Bar Leadership Series, Indianapolis Bar Association, Indianapolis, IN	Lundberg
FEB 3, 2009	Guest Lecturer: "The Lawyer Discipline System", Course in The Legal Profession, Maurer School of Law at Indiana University, Prof. Frohman, Bloomington	Lundberg
FEB 14, 2009	Panelist: "Strict Liability vs. Sciento: Filling the Mental State Gaps in the Model Rules," National Organization of Bar Counsel and Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, Boston, MA	Lundberg
FEB 20, 2009	Co-Presenter: "Ethics Update," Bingham McHale, Indianapolis	Kidd
MAR 6, 2009	Presenter: "Hey! Could We Have a Little Civility In Here?," Women's Bench-Bar Conference, Indiana State Bar Association, Culver	Lundberg

#### APPENDIX H

APR 24, 2009	Panelist: "Current Topics in Legal Ethics," Bench-Bar Conference, Allen County Bar Association, Fort Wayne	Lundberg
MAY 27, 2009	Presenter: "Professional Responsibility Review," Allen County Bar Association, Fort Wayne	Kidd
MAY 29, 2009	Panelist: "Discretion in Discipline: How Much Room Do Bar Counsel Have and How Do They Use It?," 35th Annual Conference on Professional Responsibility, Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, Chicago, IL	Lundberg
JUN 5, 2009	Panelist: "Ethics of Fee Agreements and Billing," Solo and Small Firm Conference, Indiana State Bar Association, Bel Terra Resort	Lundberg
JUN 17, 2009	Presenter: "Lawyer Discipline In Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation," Indiana Supreme Court, Evansville, IN	Iosue
JUN 19, 2009	Panelist: "Attorney Professionalism and Civility—The Role of the Judiciary," Indianapolis Bar Association Bench-Bar Conference, French Lick	Rice

#### APPENDIX H

**INDIANA SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION FUND**  
**Statement of Revenues and Expenses (Unaudited)**  
**Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2009**

BEGINNING DISCIPLINARY FUND BALANCE		\$1,343,171
REVENUES:		
TOTAL REGISTRATION FEES COLLECTED		\$1,677,010
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES:		
Court Costs	\$18,582	
Reinstatement Fees	2,000	
Investment Income	6,330	
Rule 7.3 Filing Fees	10,350	
Other	1,203	
TOTAL REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES		\$38,465
TOTAL REVENUE		\$1,715,474
EXPENSES:		
OPERATING EXPENSES:		
Personnel	\$1,613,710	
Investigations/Hearings	38,198	
Postage and Supplies	21,840	
Utilities and Rent	139,095	
Travel	40,636	
Equipment	27,834	
Other Expenses	34,076	
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES		\$1,915,389
TOTAL EXPENSES		\$1,915,389
NET INCREASE (DECREASE) IN FUND BALANCE		(\$199,915)
ENDING DISCIPLINARY FUND BALANCE		\$1,143,256

**APPENDIX I**

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## Indiana Rules of Court Rules of Professional Conduct

*Including Amendments made through January 1, 2011*

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

#### PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

#### SCOPE

##### Rule 1.0. Terminology

##### Rule 1.1. Competence

##### Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer

##### Rule 1.3. Diligence

##### Rule 1.4. Communication

##### Rule 1.5. Fees

##### Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information

##### Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients

##### Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules

##### Rule 1.9. Duties to Former Clients

##### Rule 1.10. Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule

##### Rule 1.11. Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees

##### Rule 1.12. Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral

##### Rule 1.13. Organization as Client

##### Rule 1.14. Client with Diminished Capacity

##### Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property

##### Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation

##### Rule 1.17. Sale of Law Practice

##### Rule 1.18. Duties to Prospective Client

##### Rule 2.1. Advisor

##### Rule 2.2. Intermediary

##### Rule 2.3. Evaluation for Use by Third Persons

##### Rule 2.4. Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neutral

##### Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions

##### Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation

##### Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal

##### Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

##### Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal

##### Rule 3.6. Trial Publicity

##### Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness

##### Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

##### Rule 3.9. Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings

##### Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others

##### Rule 4.2. Communication with Person Represented by Counsel

##### Rule 4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Persons

##### Rule 4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons

##### Rule 5.1. Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer

##### Rule 5.2. Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer

##### Rule 5.3. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants

##### Rule 5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer

##### Rule 5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law

##### Rule 5.6. Restrictions on Right to Practice

##### Rule 5.7. Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services

##### Rule 6.1. Pro Bono Publico Service

##### Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments

##### Rule 6.3. Membership in Legal Service Organization

Rule 6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests  
Rule 6.5 Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs  
Rule 6.6. Voluntary Attorney Pro Bono Plan  
Rule 7.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services  
Rule 7.2. Advertising  
Rule 7.3. Direct Contact with prospective Clients  
Rule 7.4. Communication of Fields of Practice and Specialization  
Rule 7.5. Firm Names and Letterheads  
Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters  
Rule 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials  
Rule 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct  
Rule 8.4. Misconduct  
Rule 8.5. Disciplinary Authority: Choice of Law  
Use of Non-Lawyer Assistants  
Introduction  
Guideline 9.1. Supervision  
Guideline 9.2. Permissible Delegation  
Guideline 9.3. Prohibited Delegation  
Guideline 9.4. Duty to Inform  
Guideline 9.5. Identification on Letterhead  
Guideline 9.6. Client Confidences  
Guideline 9.7. Charge for Services  
Guideline 9.8. Compensation  
Guideline 9.9. Continuing Legal Education  
Guideline 9.10. Legal Assistant Ethics

#### **PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES**

[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. Whether or not engaging in the practice of law, lawyers should conduct themselves honorably.

[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.

[3] In addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter. Some of these Rules apply directly to lawyers who are or have served as third-party neutrals. See, e.g., Rules 1.12 and 2.4. In addition, there are Rules that apply to lawyers who are not active in the practice of law or to practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a nonprofessional capacity. For example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a business is subject to discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. See Rule 8.4.

[4] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

[5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.

[6] As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned

profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

[7] Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.

[8] A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be an effective advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private.

[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.

[10] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.

[11] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.

[12] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.

[13] Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.

## **SCOPE**

[14] The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.

[15] The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules



and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law.

[16] Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

[17] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. See Rule 1.18. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.

[18] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority.

[19] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations.

[20] Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer, nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability, but these Rules may be used as non-conclusive evidence that a lawyer has breached a duty owed to a client. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.

[21] The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.

#### **Rule 1.0. Terminology**

- (a) "Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.
- (b) "Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (n) for the definition of "writing." See paragraph (e) for the definition of "informed consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.

- (c) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.
- (d) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.
- (e) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.
- (f) "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
- (g) "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice law.
- (h) "Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
- (i) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
- (j) "Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.
- (k) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.
- (l) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.
- (m) "Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator, or any other neutral body or neutral individual making a decision, based on evidence presented and the law applicable to that evidence, which decision is binding on the parties involved.
- (n) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or videorecording or e-mail. A "signed" writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.

#### Comment

##### Confirmed in Writing

[1] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.

##### Firm

[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (c) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.

[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear



whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.

[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.

#### **Fraud**

[5] When used in these Rules, the terms "fraud" or "fraudulent" refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.

#### **Informed Consent**

[6] Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.

[7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a). For a definition of "writing" and "confirmed in writing," see paragraphs (n) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8(a) and (g). For a definition of "signed," see paragraph (n).

#### **Screened**

[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.10, 1.11, 1.12 or 1.18.

[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.

[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.

#### **Rule 1.1. Competence**

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

##### **Legal Knowledge and Skill**

[1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.

[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.

[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest.

[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.

##### **Thoroughness and Preparation**

[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c).

##### **Maintaining Competence**

[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.

#### **Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer**

- (a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
- (b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
- (c) A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.

- (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

#### **Comment**

##### **Allocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer**

[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.

[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concerns for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3).

[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time.

[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.

##### **Independence from Client's Views or Activities**

[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities.

##### **Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation**

[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant, unethical, or imprudent.

[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1.

[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6.

##### **Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions**

[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1.

[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.

[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.

[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).

### **Rule 1.3. Diligence**

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

#### **Comment**

[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

[2] A lawyer's workload must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.

[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.

[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client



about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2.

[5] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. Cf. Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 27 (providing for court appointment of a lawyer to inventory files and take other protective action in absence of a plan providing for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a deceased or disabled lawyer).

#### **Rule 1.4. Communication**

(a) A lawyer shall:

- (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;
- (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
- (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
- (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
- (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or assistance limited under Rule 1.2(c).

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

#### **Comment**

[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.

#### **Communicating with Client**

[2] If these Rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2(a).

[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations -- depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client -- this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.

[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged.

#### **Explaining Matters**

[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing

and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e).

[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.

#### **Withholding Information**

[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.

#### **Rule 1.5. Fees**

- (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
  - (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
  - (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
  - (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
  - (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
  - (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
  - (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
  - (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
  - (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
- (b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.
- (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a

written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:

- (1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or upon the amount of maintenance, support, or property settlement, or obtaining custody of a child; or
- (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in a domestic relations post-judgment collection action, provided the attorney clearly advises his or her client in writing of the alternative measures available for the collection of such debt and, in all other particulars, complies with Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c).

(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

- (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
- (2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
- (3) the total fee is reasonable.

#### Comment

##### Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses

[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer.

##### Basis or Rate of Fee

[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding.

[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees in certain tax matters.

##### Terms of Payment

[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.

[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise,

the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.

#### **Prohibited Contingent Fees**

[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a dissolution or obtaining custody of a child or upon the amount of maintenance or support or property settlement to be obtained.

#### **Division of Fee**

[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.

[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.

#### **Disputes over Fees**

[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.

#### **Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information**

- (a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
- (b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
  - (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
  - (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or from committing fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
  - (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
  - (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
  - (5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or
  - (6) to comply with other law or a court order.
- (c) In the event of a lawyer's physical or mental disability or the appointment of a guardian or conservator of an attorney's client files, disclosure of a client's names and files is authorized to the extent necessary to carry out the duties of the person managing the lawyer's files.



### Comment

[1] This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client and Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.

[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.

[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.

[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.

### Authorized Disclosure

[5] Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.

### Disclosure Adverse to Client

[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.

[7] Paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime or from committing fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d), that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may

not counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c), which permits the lawyer, where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited circumstances.

[8] Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of the client's crime or fraud until after it has been consummated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the affected person can be prevented, rectified or mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Paragraph (b)(3) does not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense.

[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

[10] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.

[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.

[12] Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.

[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.

[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

[15] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other Rules. Some Rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3. Rule

3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c).

#### **Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality**

[16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.

[17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.

#### **Former Client**

[18] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.

#### **Disability of an Attorney**

[19] Paragraph (c) is intended to operate in conjunction with Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 27, as well as such other arrangements as may be implemented by agreement to deal with the physical or mental disability of a lawyer.

#### **Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients**

- (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
  - (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
  - (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
- (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
  - (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
  - (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
  - (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
  - (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

#### **Comment**

##### **General Principles**

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0 (e) and (b).

[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with

the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.

[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].

[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by or merged with another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

#### **Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse**

[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.

[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

#### **Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation**

[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.

#### **Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons**

[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be



materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

#### **Personal Interest Conflicts**

[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).

[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.

[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).

#### **Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service**

[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

#### **Prohibited Representations**

[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.

[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).

[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest.

[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

**Informed Consent**

[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).

[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.

**Consent Confirmed in Writing**

[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client. In the alternative, the lawyer shall promptly transmit a writing to the client confirming the client's oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

**Revoking Consent**

[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

**Consent to Future Conflict**

[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).

**Conflicts in Litigation**

[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or

the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long term interests of the clients involved, and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.

[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.

#### **Nonlitigation Conflicts**

[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].

[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.

[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

#### **Special Considerations in Common Representation**

[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if

the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer may have to withdraw from representing one or more or all of the common clients if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the others. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c) and 2.2

[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.

#### **Organizational Clients**

[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.

[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

#### **Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules**

- (a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
  - (1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably



- understood by the client;
- (2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and
  - (3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.
- (b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.
  - (c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.
  - (d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.
  - (e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
    - (1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
    - (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
  - (f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
    - (1) the client gives informed consent;
    - (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
    - (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
  - (g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
  - (h) A lawyer shall not:
    - (1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement; or
    - (2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith.
  - (i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
    - (1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
    - (2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
  - (j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.
  - (k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in paragraphs (a) through (i) and (l) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.
  - (l) A part-time prosecutor or deputy prosecutor authorized by statute to otherwise engage in the practice of law shall refrain from representing a private client in any matter wherein exists an issue upon which

said prosecutor has statutory prosecutorial authority or responsibilities. This restriction is not intended to prohibit representation in tort cases in which investigation and any prosecution of infractions has terminated, nor to prohibit representation in family law matters involving no issue subject to prosecutorial authority or responsibilities. Upon a prior, express written limitation of responsibility to exclude prosecutorial authority in matters related to family law, a part-time deputy prosecutor may fully represent private clients in cases involving family law.

#### Comment

##### Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer

[1] A lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, for example, the sale of title insurance or investment services to existing clients of the lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary initial fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. Paragraph (a) applies when a lawyer seeks to renegotiate the terms of the fee arrangement with the client after representation begins in order to reach a new agreement that is more advantageous to the lawyer than the initial fee arrangement. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

[2] Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).

[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.

[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.

##### Use of Information Related to Representation

[5] Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does

not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3.

#### **Gifts to Lawyers**

[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).

[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a relative of the donee.

[8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

#### **Literary Rights**

[9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraphs (a) and (i).

#### **Financial Assistance**

[10] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warranted.

#### **Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services**

[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).

[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is

significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client). Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.

#### **Aggregate Settlements**

[13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

#### **Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims**

[14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.

[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.

#### **Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation**

[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized by law. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by Rule 1.5.

#### **Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships**

[17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship



presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.

[18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).

[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.

#### **Imputation of Prohibitions**

[20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) and (l) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another member of the firm without complying with paragraph (a), even if the first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. The prohibition set forth in paragraph (j) is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers.

#### **Part-time prosecutor or deputy prosecutor**

[21] Under paragraph (l) special rules are provided for part-time prosecutors and deputy prosecutors.

#### **Rule 1.9. Duties to Former Clients**

- (a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- (b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client
  - (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
  - (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- (c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
  - (1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or
  - (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

#### **Comment**

[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected

clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.

[2] The scope of a "matter" for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.

[3] Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.

#### **Lawyers Moving Between Firms**

[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.

[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm.

[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client.

[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(e). With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Comment [22] to Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10.

#### **Rule 1.10. Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule**

- (a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.9, or 2.2 unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.
- (b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm unless:
  - (1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
  - (2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.
- (c) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in the firm shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless:
  - (1) the personally disqualified lawyer did not have primary responsibility for the matter that causes the disqualification under Rule 1.9;
  - (2) the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
  - (3) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
- (d) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
- (e) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11.

#### **Comment**

##### **Definition of "Firm"**

[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(c). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0, Comments [2]--[4].

##### **Principles of Imputed Disqualification**

[2] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b), and 1.10(b) and 1.10(c).

[3] The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented.

[4] The rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did while a law student. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(k) and 5.3.

[5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

[6] Where the conditions of paragraph (c) are met, imputation is removed, and consent to the new representation is not required. Lawyers should be aware, however, that courts may impose more stringent obligations in ruling upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation. Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(k). Paragraph (c)(2) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[7] Rule 1.10(d) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7, Comment [22]. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(e).

[8] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.

[9] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.

**Rule 1.11. Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees**

- (a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government:
  - (1) is subject to Rule 1.9(c); and
  - (2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing to the representation.
- (b) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under paragraph (a), no lawyer in the firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:
  - (1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
  - (2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain



compliance with the provisions of this rule.

- (c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this Rule, the term "confidential government information" means information that has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.
- (d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee:
  - (1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and
  - (2) shall not:
    - (i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or
    - (ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer, or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).
- (e) As used in this Rule, the term "matter" includes:
  - (1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and
  - (2) any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.

#### Comment

[1] A lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7. In addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent.

[2] Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former government or private client. Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by this Rule. Rather, paragraph (b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers that provides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.

[3] Paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of another client. For example, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of the government may not pursue the same claim on behalf of a later private client after the lawyer has left government service, except when authorized to do so by the government agency under paragraph (a). Similarly, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of a private client may not pursue the claim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so by paragraph (d). As with paragraphs (a)(1) and (d)(1), Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by these paragraphs.

[4] This Rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit

to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. Thus a former government lawyer is disqualified only from particular matters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. The provisions for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. The limitation of disqualification in paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) to matters involving a specific party or parties, rather than extending disqualification to all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.

[5] When a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency as another client for purposes of this Rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. However, because the conflict of interest is governed by paragraph (d), the latter agency is not required to screen the lawyer as paragraph (b) requires a law firm to do. The question of whether two government agencies should be regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the scope of these Rules. See Rule 1.13 Comment [6].

[6] Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. See Rule 1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). These paragraphs do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[7] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[8] Paragraph (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.

[9] Paragraphs (a) and (d) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government agency when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.

[10] For purposes of paragraph (e) of this Rule, a "matter" may continue in another form. In determining whether two particular matters are the same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties, and the time elapsed.

#### **Rule 1.12. Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral**

- (a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- (b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to any such person may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the law clerk's employer.
- (c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
  - (1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
  - (2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
- (d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.

### Comment

[1] This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term “personally and substantially” signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the Comment to Rule 1.11. The term “adjudicative officer” includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. The Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not “act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.” Although phrased differently from this Rule, those rules correspond in meaning.

[2] Like former judges, lawyers who have served as arbitrators, mediators or other third-party neutrals may be asked to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. This Rule forbids such representation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informed consent, confirmed in writing. See Rule 1.0(e) and (b). Other law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed disqualification. See Rule 2.4.

[3] Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not have information concerning the parties that is protected under Rule 1.6, they typically owe the parties an obligation of confidentiality under law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals. Thus, paragraph (c) provides that conflicts of the personally disqualified lawyer will be imputed to other lawyers in a law firm unless the conditions of this paragraph are met.

[4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(k). Paragraph (c)(1) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[5] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

### Rule 1.13. Organization as Client

- (a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.
- (b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
- (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
  - (1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and
  - (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
- (d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.

- (e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.
- (f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
- (g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.

#### Comment

##### The Entity as the Client

[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other constituents" as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.

[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.

[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization.

[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority,



including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.

#### **Relation to Other Rules**

[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1)–(6). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyer's representation of the organization. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) may permit the lawyer to disclose confidential information. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be required.

[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim.

[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

#### **Government Agency**

[9] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [18]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope.

#### **Clarifying the Lawyer's Role**

[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged.

[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case.

#### **Dual Representation**

[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder.

**Derivative Actions**

[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.

[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.

**Rule 1.14. Client with Diminished Capacity**

(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.

(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.

(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.

(d) This Rule is not violated if the lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the Rule.

**Comment**

[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions.

[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person has a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication.

[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf.

[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d).

**Taking Protective Action**

[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm

unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decision making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections.

[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.

[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.

#### **Disclosure of the Client's Condition**

[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one.

#### **Emergency Legal Assistance**

[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.

[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken.

#### **Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property**

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection



- with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.
- (b) A lawyer may deposit his or her own funds reasonably sufficient to maintain a nominal balance in a client trust account.
  - (c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
  - (d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which the client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
  - (e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute.
  - (f) Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this rule, a lawyer or law firm shall create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account for clients' funds which are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time so that they could not earn income for the client in excess of the costs incurred to secure such income (hereinafter sometimes referred to as an "IOLTA account") in compliance with the following provisions:
    - (1) Client funds shall be deposited in a lawyer's or law firm's IOLTA account unless the funds can earn income for the client in excess of the costs incurred to secure such income. A lawyer or law firm shall establish a separate interest-bearing trust account for clients' funds which are neither nominal in amount nor to be held for a short period of time and which could earn income for the client in excess of costs for a particular client or client's matter. All of the interest on such account, net of any transaction costs, shall be paid to the client, and no earnings from such account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.
    - (2) No earnings from such an IOLTA account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.
    - (3) The IOLTA account shall include all clients' funds which are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time.
    - (4) An IOLTA account may be established with any financial institution (i) authorized by federal or state law to do business in Indiana, (ii) insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or its equivalent, and (iii) approved as a depository for trust accounts pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rules, Rule 23, Section 29. Funds in each IOLTA account shall be subject to withdrawal upon request and without delay and without risk to principal by reason of said withdrawal.
    - (5) Participating financial institutions shall maintain IOLTA accounts which pay the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA account customers when IOLTA accounts meet or exceed the same minimum balance or other account eligibility qualifications, if any. In determining the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA accounts, eligible institutions may consider factors, in addition to the IOLTA account balance, customarily considered by the institution when setting interest rates or dividends for its customers, provided that such factors do not discriminate between IOLTA accounts and accounts of non-IOLTA customers, and that these factors do not include that the account is an IOLTA account. All interest earned net of fees or charges shall be remitted to the Indiana Bar Foundation (the "Foundation"), which is designated in paragraph (i) of this rule to organize and administer the IOLTA program, and the depository institution shall submit reports thereon as set forth below.
    - (6) Lawyers or law firms depositing client funds in an IOLTA account established pursuant to this rule shall, on forms approved by the Foundation, direct the depository institution:

- (a) to remit all interest or dividends, net of reasonable service charges or fees, if any, on the average monthly balance in the account, or as otherwise computed in accordance with the institution's standard accounting practice, at least quarterly, solely to the Foundation. The depository institution may remit the interest or dividends on all of its IOLTA accounts in a lump sum; however, the depository institution must provide, for each individual IOLTA account, the information to the lawyer or law firm and to the Foundation required by subparagraphs (f)(6)(B) and (f)(6)(C) of this rule;
  - (b) to transmit with each remittance to the Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the rate of interest applied, and such other information as is reasonably required by the Foundation;
  - (c) to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm a periodic account statement for the IOLTA account reflecting the amount of interest paid to the Foundation, the rate of interest applied, the average account balance for the period for which the interest was earned, and such other information as is reasonably required by the Foundation; and
  - (d) to waive any reasonable service charge that exceeds the interest earned on any IOLTA account during a reporting period ("excess charge"), or bill the excess charge to the Foundation.
- (7) Any IOLTA account which has or may have the net effect of costing the IOLTA program more in fees than earned in interest over a period of time may, at the discretion of the Foundation, be exempted from and removed from the IOLTA program. Exemption of an IOLTA account from the IOLTA program revokes the permission to use the Foundation's tax identification number for that account. Exemption of such account from the IOLTA program shall not relieve the lawyer and/or law firm from the obligation to maintain the property of clients and third persons separately, as required above, in a non-interest bearing account.
- (8) The IOLTA program will issue refunds when interest has been remitted in error, whether the error is the bank's or the lawyer's. Requests for refunds must be submitted in writing by the bank, the lawyer, or the law firm on a timely basis, accompanied by documentation that confirms the amount of interest paid to the IOLTA program. As needed for auditing purposes, the IOLTA program may request additional documentation to support the request. The refund will be remitted to the appropriate financial institution for transmittal at the lawyer's direction after appropriate accounting and reporting. In no event will the refund exceed the amount of interest actually received by the IOLTA program.
- (9) All interest transmitted to the Foundation shall be held, invested and distributed periodically in accordance with a plan of distribution which shall be prepared by the Foundation and approved at least annually by the Supreme Court of Indiana, for the following purposes:
- (a) to pay or provide for all costs, expenses and fees associated with the administration of the IOLTA program;
  - (b) to establish appropriate reserves;
  - (c) to assist or establish approved pro bono programs as provided in Rule 6.6;
  - (d) for such other programs for the benefit of the public as are specifically approved by the Supreme Court from time to time.
- (10) The information contained in the statements forwarded to the Foundation under subparagraph (f)(6) of this rule shall remain confidential and the provisions of Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), are not hereby abrogated; therefore the Foundation shall not release any information contained in any such statement other than as a compilation of data from such statements, except as directed in writing by the Supreme Court.
- (11) The Foundation shall have full authority to and shall, from time to time, prepare and submit to the Supreme Court for approval, forms, procedures, instructions and guidelines necessary and appropriate to implement the provisions set forth in this rule and, after approval thereof by the Court, shall promulgate same.
- (g) Every lawyer admitted to practice in this State shall annually certify to this Court, pursuant to Ind. Admis. Disc. R. 2(f), that all client funds which are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time by the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm so that they could not earn income for the client in

excess of the costs incurred to secure such income are held in an IOLTA account, or that the lawyer is exempt because:

- (1) the lawyer or law firm's client trust account has been exempted and removed from the IOLTA program by the Foundation pursuant to subparagraph (f)(7) of this rule; or
- (2) the lawyer:
  - (a) is not engaged in the private practice of law;
  - (b) is not engaged in the private practice of law in Indiana that involves holding client or third party funds in trust;
  - (c) does not have an office within the State of Indiana;
  - (d) is a judge, attorney general, public defender, U.S. attorney, district attorney, on duty with the armed services or employed by a local, state or federal government, and is not otherwise engaged in the private practice of law;
  - (e) is a corporate counsel or teacher of law and is not otherwise engaged in the private practice of law;
  - (f) has been exempted by an order of general or special application of this Court which is cited in the certification; or
  - (g) compliance with paragraph (f) would work an undue hardship on the lawyer or would be extremely impractical, based either on the geographic distance between the lawyer's principal office and the closest depository institution which is participating in the IOLTA program, or on other compelling and necessitous factors.
- (h) In the exercise of a lawyer's good faith judgment in determining whether funds of a client can earn income in excess of costs, a lawyer shall take into consideration the following factors:
  - (1) the amount of interest which the funds would earn during the period they are expected to be deposited;
  - (2) the cost of establishing and administering the account, including the cost of the lawyer's services, accounting fees, and tax reporting costs and procedures;
  - (3) the capability of a financial institution, a lawyer or a law firm to calculate and pay income to individual clients;
  - (4) any other circumstances that affect the ability of the client's funds to earn a net return for the client; and
  - (5) the nature of the transaction(s) involved. The determination of whether a client's funds are nominal or short-term so that they could not earn income in excess of costs shall rest in the sound judgment of the lawyer or law firm. No lawyer shall be charged with an ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct based on the good faith exercise of such judgment.
- (i) The Foundation is hereby designated as the entity to organize and administer the IOLTA program established by paragraph (f) of this rule in accordance with the following provisions:
  - (1) The Board of Directors of the Foundation (the "Board") shall have general supervisory authority over the administration of the IOLTA program, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
  - (2) The Board shall receive the net earnings from IOLTA accounts established in accordance with paragraph (f) of this rule and shall make appropriate temporary investments of IOLTA program funds pending disbursement of such funds.
  - (3) The Board shall, by grants, appropriations and other appropriate measures, make disbursements from the IOLTA program funds, including current and accumulated net earnings, in accordance with the plan of distribution approved by the Supreme Court from time to time referenced in subparagraph (f)(9) of this rule.
  - (4) The Board shall maintain proper records of all IOLTA program receipts and disbursements, which records shall be audited or reviewed annually by a certified public

- accountant selected by the Board. The Board shall annually cause to be presented to the Supreme Court a reviewed or audited financial statement of its IOLTA program receipts and expenditures for the prior year. The report shall not identify any clients of lawyers or law firms or reveal confidential information. The statement shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and a summary thereof shall be published in the next available issue of one or more state-wide publications for attorneys, such as *Res Gestae* and *The Indiana Lawyer*.
- (5) The president and other members of the Board shall administer the IOLTA program without compensation, but may be reimbursed for their reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties, and shall be indemnified by the Foundation against any liability or expense arising directly or indirectly out of the good faith performance of their duties.
  - (6) The Board shall monitor attorney compliance with the provisions of this rule and periodically report to the Supreme Court those attorneys not in compliance with the provisions of Rule 1.15.
  - (7) In the event the IOLTA program or its administration by the Foundation is terminated, all assets of the IOLTA program, including any program funds then on hand, shall be transferred in accordance with the Order of the Supreme Court terminating the IOLTA program or its administration by the Foundation; provided, such transfer shall be to an entity which will not violate the requirements the Foundation must observe regarding transfer of its assets in order to retain its tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or similar future provisions of law.

#### Comment

[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property that is the property of clients or third persons, including prospective clients, must be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. A lawyer should maintain on a current basis books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice and comply with any recordkeeping rules established by law or court order. See, e.g., ABA Model

#### Financial Recordkeeping Rule.

[2] While normally it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer's own funds with client funds, paragraph (b) provides that it is permissible when necessary to maintain a nominal balance in the account. Accurate records must be kept regarding which part of the funds are the lawyer's.

[3] Lawyers often receive funds from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. The lawyer is not required to remit to the client, funds that the lawyer reasonably believes represent fees owed. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds must be kept in a trust account and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.

[4] Paragraph (e) also recognizes that third parties may have lawful claims against specific funds or other property in a lawyer's custody, such as a client's creditor who has a lien on funds recovered in a personal injury action. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client. In such cases, when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law, the lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client until the claims are resolved. A lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party, but, when there are substantial grounds for dispute as to the person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an action to have a court resolve the dispute.

[5] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves only as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction and is not governed by this Rule.

[6] A lawyers' fund for client protection provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a

fund has been established, a lawyer must participate where it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should participate.

**Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation**

- (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
  - (1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
  - (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
  - (3) the lawyer is discharged.
- (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:
  - (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;
  - (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
  - (3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
  - (4) a client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;
  - (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
  - (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
  - (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
- (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
- (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.

**Comment**

[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded. See Rules 1.2(c) and 6.5. See also Rule 1.3, Comment [4].

**Mandatory Withdrawal**

[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.

[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations to both clients and the court under Rules 1.6 and 3.3.



**Discharge**

[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.

[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring self-representation by the client.

[6] If the client has severely diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in Rule 1.14.

**Optional Withdrawal**

[7] A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer may also withdraw where the client insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.

[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

**Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal**

[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law. See Rule 1.15.

**Rule 1.17. Sale of Law Practice**

A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, or an area of law practice, including goodwill, if the following conditions are satisfied:

- (a) The seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been sold, in the geographic area in which the practice has been conducted.
- (b) The entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is sold to one or more lawyers or law firms.
- (c) The seller gives written notice to each of the seller's clients regarding:
  - (1) the proposed sale;
  - (2) the client's right to retain other counsel or to take possession of the file; and
  - (3) the fact that the client's consent to the transfer of the client's files will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety (90) days of receipt of the notice.

If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file.

- (d) The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale.

**Comment**

[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this Rule, when a lawyer or an entire firm ceases to practice, or ceases to practice in an area of law, and other lawyers or firms take over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may

obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4 and 5.6.

#### **Termination of Practice by the Seller**

[2] The requirement that all of the private practice, or all of an area of practice, be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice, or the area of practice, available for sale to the purchasers. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchasers but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances does not necessarily result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office or resigns from a judiciary position.

[3] The requirement that the seller cease to engage in the private practice of law does not prohibit employment as a lawyer on the staff of a public agency or a legal services entity that provides legal services to the poor, or as in-house counsel to a business.

[4] This Rule also permits a lawyer or law firm to sell an area of practice. If an area of practice is sold and the lawyer remains in the active practice of law, the lawyer must cease accepting any matters in the area of practice that has been sold, either as counsel or co-counsel or by assuming joint responsibility for a matter in connection with the division of a fee with another lawyer as would otherwise be permitted by Rule 1.5(e). For example, a lawyer with a substantial number of estate planning matters and a substantial number of probate administration cases may sell the estate planning portion of the practice but remain in the practice of law by concentrating on probate administration; however, that practitioner may not thereafter accept any estate planning matters. Although a lawyer who leaves a jurisdiction or geographical area typically would sell the entire practice, this Rule permits the lawyer to limit the sale to one or more areas of the practice, thereby preserving the lawyer's right to continue practice in the areas of the practice that were not sold.

#### **Sale of Entire Practice or Entire Area of Practice**

[5] The Rule requires that the seller's entire practice, or an entire area of practice, be sold. The prohibition against sale of less than an entire practice area protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchasers are required to undertake all client matters in the practice or practice area, subject to client consent. This requirement is satisfied, however, even if a purchaser is unable to undertake a particular client matter because of a conflict of interest.

#### **Client Confidences, Consent and Notice**

[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6 than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The Rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed.

[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the Rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The Court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera.

[8] All elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice or area of practice.

#### **Fee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser**

[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing arrangements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the



purchaser.

#### **Other Applicable Ethical Standards**

[10] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice or a practice area are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure the client's informed consent for those conflicts that can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7 regarding conflicts and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9).

[11] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16).

#### **Applicability of the Rule**

[12] This Rule applies to the sale of a law practice of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these Rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this Rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met.

[13] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this Rule.

[14] This Rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice or an area of practice.

#### **Rule 1.18. Duties to Prospective Client**

- (a) A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.
- (b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.
- (c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).
- (d) When a lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:
  - (1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or:
  - (2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and
    - (i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
    - (ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

#### **Comment**

[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's discussions with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection

afforded clients.

[2] Not all persons who communicate information to a lawyer are entitled to protection under this Rule. A person who communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, is not a "prospective client" within the meaning of paragraph (a).

[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.

[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial interview to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation.

[5] A lawyer may condition conversations with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent.

[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter.

[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this Rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d)(1), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of paragraph (d)(2) are met and all disqualified lawyers are timely screened and written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. See Rule 1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). Paragraph (d)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[8] Notice, including a general description of the subject matter about which the lawyer was consulted, and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[9] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.

[10] Paragraph (d) also applies to other lawyers in the firm with whom the receiving lawyer actually shared disqualifying information.

#### **Rule 2.1. Advisor**

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.

#### **Comment**

##### **Scope of Advice**

[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

[2] Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.

[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations.

[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.

#### **Offering Advice**

[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related to the representation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.

#### **Rule 2.2. Intermediary**

- (a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
  - (1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
  - (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
  - (3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
- (b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
- (c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.

#### **Comment**

[1] A lawyer acts as intermediary under this rule when the lawyer represents two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the parties share responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common representation may be inferred from other circumstances. Because confusion can arise as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately represented, it is important that the lawyer make clear the relationship.

[2] The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the

American Arbitration Association.

[3] A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or mediating a dispute between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility in some situations of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as intermediary.

[4] In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer should be mindful that if the intermediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. In some situations the risk of failure is so great that intermediation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent or who contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good.

[5] The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. Forms of intermediation range from informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the respective client and the lawyer decides the outcome, to mediation, to common representation where the clients' interests are substantially though not entirely compatible. One form may be appropriate in circumstances where another would not. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the parties or terminating one.

#### **Confidentiality and Privilege**

[6] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both to keep each client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. See Rules 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirements while acting as intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common representation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

[7] Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, intermediation is improper when that impartiality cannot be maintained. For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period and in a variety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between that client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced.

#### **Consultation**

[8] In acting as intermediary between clients, the lawyer is required to consult with the clients on the implications of doing so, and proceed only upon consent based on such a consultation. The consultation should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances.

[9] Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the lawyer is intermediary, the clients ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is independently represented.

#### **Withdrawal**

[10] Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the client-lawyer relationship. Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16, and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning obligations to a former client.

#### **Rule 2.3. Evaluation for Use by Third Persons**

- (a) A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client.
- (b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.



- (c) Except as disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

#### **Comment**

##### **Definition**

[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction or when impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.2. Such an evaluation may be for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government agency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business.

[2] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available.

##### **Duties Owed to Third Person and Client**

[3] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.

##### **Access to and Disclosure of Information**

[4] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations that are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In no circumstances is the lawyer permitted to knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law in providing an evaluation under this Rule. See Rule 4.1.

##### **Obtaining Client's Informed Consent**

[5] Information relating to an evaluation is protected by Rule 1.6. In many situations, providing an evaluation to a third party poses no significant risk to the client; thus, the lawyer may be impliedly authorized to disclose information to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.6(a). Where, however, it is reasonably likely that providing the evaluation will affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer must first obtain the client's consent after the client has been adequately informed concerning the important possible effects on the client's interests. See Rules 1.6(a) and 1.0(e).

##### **Financial Auditors' Requests for Information**

[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association

Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975.

**Rule 2.4. Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neutral**

- (a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.
- (b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.

**Comment**

[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court.

[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.

[3] Unlike nonlawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected.

[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12.

[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(m)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1.

**Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions**

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

**Comment**

- [1] The advocate has a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive,



establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.

[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

[3] The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.

### **Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation**

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

#### **Comment**

[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

### **Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal**

- (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
  - (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
  - (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
  - (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
- (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
- (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
- (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

#### **Comment**

[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(m) for the definition of "tribunal." It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false.

[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

#### **Representations by a Lawyer**

[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b).

#### **Legal Argument**

[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.

#### **Offering Evidence**

[5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.

[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false.

[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9].

[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

[9] Although paragraph (a)(3) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7].

#### **Remedial Measures**

[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the

lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done -- making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.

[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

#### **Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process**

[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.

#### **Duration of Obligation**

[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed.

#### **Ex Parte Proceedings**

[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.

#### **Withdrawal**

[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

#### **Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel**

A lawyer shall not:

- (a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist

another person to do any such act;

- (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
- (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;
- (d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;
- (e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or
- (f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
  - (1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and
  - (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.

#### Comment

[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.

[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter its potential evidentiary value. In such a case, applicable law may require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.

[3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.

[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2.

#### **Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal**

A lawyer shall not:

- (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;
- (b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order;
- (c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:
  - (1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;
  - (2) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or
  - (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.
- (d) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.

#### Comment

[1] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions.

[2] During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court order.

[3] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication.

[4] The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.

[5] The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a deposition. See Rule 1.0(m).

### **Rule 3.6. Trial Publicity**

- (a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
- (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
  - (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
  - (2) information contained in a public record;
  - (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
  - (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
  - (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
  - (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
  - (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
    - (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
    - (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
    - (iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
    - (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
- (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
- (d) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) will be rebuttably presumed to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding when it refers to that proceeding and the statement is related to:
  - (1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or



witness;

- (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
  - (3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
  - (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;
  - (5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
  - (6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.
- (c) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).

#### Comment

[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.

[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance with such rules.

[3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates.

[4] Paragraph (b) identifies specific matters about which a lawyer's statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general prohibition of paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters may be subject to paragraph (a).

[5] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding.

[6] See Rule 3.8(f) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection with extrajudicial statements about criminal proceedings.

[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created



by the statements made by others.

**Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness**

- (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:
  - (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
  - (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or
  - (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
- (b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

**Comment**

[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.

**Advocate-Witness Rule**

[2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

[3] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony.

[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The conflict of interest principles stated in Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10 have no application to this aspect of the problem.

[5] Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to do so except in situations involving a conflict of interest.

**Conflict of Interest**

[6] In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a conflict of interest that will require compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer the representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a) from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer's disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph (a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the client's consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(b) for the definition of "confirmed in writing" and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of "informed consent."

[7] Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer

with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

### **Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor**

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

- (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
- (b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
- (c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
- (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;
- (e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:
  - (1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
  - (2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
  - (3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information;
- (f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.

#### **Comment**

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.

[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence.

[3] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.

[4] Paragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship.

[5] Paragraph (f) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is

intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6(b), 3.6(c) or 3.6(d).

[6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for or are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the prosecutor of the importance of these obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

#### **Rule 3.9. Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings**

A lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3 (a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c), and 3.5.

##### **Comment**

[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body must deal with it honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure. See Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c) and 3.5.

[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts.

[3] This Rule only applies when a lawyer represents a client in connection with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to which the lawyer or the lawyer's client is presenting evidence or argument. It does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental agency or in connection with an application for a license or other privilege or the client's compliance with generally applicable reporting requirements, such as the filing of income-tax returns. Nor does it apply to the representation of a client in connection with an investigation or examination of the client's affairs conducted by government investigators or examiners. Representation in such matters is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4.

#### **Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others**

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

- (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
- (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

##### **Comment**

##### **Misrepresentation**

[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4.

##### **Statements of Fact**

[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the

subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.

#### **Crime or Fraud by Client**

[3] . Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Paragraph (b) states a specific application of the principle set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

#### **Rule 4.2. Communication with Person Represented by Counsel**

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law or a court order.

#### **Comment**

[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation.

[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.

[3] The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule.

[4] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a). Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to make. Also, a lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so.

[5] Communications authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government. Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule.

[6] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury.

[7] In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or



has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. Consent of the organization's lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent. If a constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See Rule 4.4.

[8] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious.

[9] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3.

#### **Rule 4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Persons**

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

##### **Comment**

[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(d).

[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented person's interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations.

#### **Rule 4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons**

- (a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.
- (b) A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

##### **Comment**

[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly sent or

produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, "document" includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being read or put into readable form.

[3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.

#### **Rule 5.1. Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer**

- (a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possess comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:
  - (1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
  - (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

#### **Comment**

[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(c). This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm.

[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures may include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules.

[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a).

[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the



firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the misrepresentation.

[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation.

[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a).

#### **Rule 5.2. Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer**

- (a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.
- (b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

#### **Comment**

[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.

[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.

#### **Rule 5.3. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants**

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

- (a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possess comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
- (b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
- (c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
  - (1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
  - (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

### Comment

[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, paralegals and other paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they may not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.

[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer.

### **Rule 5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer**

- (a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
- (1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
  - (2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed upon purchase price; and
  - (3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
- (b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
- (c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
- (d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
- (1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
  - (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or
  - (3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

### Comment

[1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment.

[2] This Rule also expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal services to another. See also Rule 1.8(f) (lawyer may accept compensation from a third party as long as there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the client gives informed consent).

### **Rule 5.5. Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law**

- (a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in

that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.

(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:

- (1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or
- (2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.

(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:

- (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
- (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;
- (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or
- (4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.

(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:

- (1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or
- (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.

#### Comment

[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person.

[2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paralegals and other paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3.

[3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paralegals and other paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.

[4] Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a lawyer who is not admitted to practice generally in the State of Indiana violates paragraph (b) if the lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in the State of Indiana for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not physically present here. For example, advertising in media specifically targeted to Indiana residents or initiating contact with Indiana residents for solicitation purposes could be viewed as systematic and continuous presence. In any event, such a lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana. See also Rules 7.1(a) and 7.5(b).

[5] There are occasions in which a lawyer admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of his or her clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this

Rule does not authorize a lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here.

[6] There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a "temporary basis" in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c). Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation.

[7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to lawyers who are admitted to practice law in any United States jurisdiction, which includes the District of Columbia and any state, territory or commonwealth of the United States. The word "admitted" in paragraph (c) contemplates that the lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted and excludes a lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the lawyer is on inactive status.

[8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For this paragraph to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client.

[9] Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the lawyer to obtain that authority.

[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction.

[11] When a lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the lawyer responsible for the litigation.

[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a lawyer admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. The lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so require.

[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers.

[14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. A variety of factors evidence such a relationship. The lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the lawyer, or may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction. In other cases, significant aspects of the lawyer's work might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction. The necessary relationship might arise when the client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each. In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a



particular body of federal, nationally uniform, foreign, or international law.

[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a lawyer who is admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a lawyer who is admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction and who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction.

[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the lawyer's work.

[17] If an employed lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education. See, Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 6, sections 2 through 5.

[18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent.

[19] A lawyer who practices law in the State of Indiana pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of the State of Indiana. See Rule 8.5(a).

[20] In some circumstances, a lawyer who practices law in the State of Indiana pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the lawyer is not licensed to practice law in the State of Indiana. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in the State of Indiana and requires knowledge of the law of the State of Indiana. See Rule 1.4(b).

[21] Paragraphs (c) and (d) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in the State of Indiana by lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in the State of Indiana is governed by Rules 7.2 to 7.5.

#### **Rule 5.6. Restrictions on Right to Practice**

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

- (a) a partnership, shareholder, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
- (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.

#### **Comment**

[1] An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm.

[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client.

[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17.

#### **Rule 5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services**

- (a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-

related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:

- (1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
  - (2) in other circumstance by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
- (b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a non-lawyer.

#### Comment

[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so or uses a law license to promote an organization or otherwise creates a basis for a belief that the client may be dealing with an attorney (such as where a person uses "J.D." on business cards or stationary or hangs framed law degrees or court admissions on office walls), there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case.

[2] Rule 5.7 applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed and whether the law-related services are performed through a law firm or a separate entity. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4.

[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services must adhere to the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in paragraph (a)(1). Even when the law-related and legal services are provided in circumstances that are distinct from each other, for example through separate entities or different support staff within the law firm, the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the lawyer as provided in paragraph (a)(2) unless the lawyer takes reasonable measures to assure that the recipient of the law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not apply.

[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.

[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8 (a).

[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing.

[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to



making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit.

[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity that the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and medical or environmental consulting.

[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(a), (b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6 relating to disclosure of confidential information. Where the provision of law-related services is subject to these Rules, the promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.2, through 7.5, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law.

[11] When the full protections of all of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).

#### **Rule 6.1. Pro Bono Publico Service**

A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.

#### **Comment**

[1] The American Bar Association House of Delegates has formally acknowledged "the basic responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest legal services" without fee, or at a substantially reduced fee, in one or more of the following areas: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization representation and the administration of justice. The Indiana State Bar Association's House of Delegates has declared that "all Indiana lawyers have an ethical and a social obligation to provide uncompensated legal assistance to poor persons" and adopted an aspirational goal of fifty hours a year, or an equivalent financial contribution, for each member of the bar.

For purposes of this paragraph:

- (a) Poverty law means legal representation of a client who does not have the financial resources to compensate counsel.
- (b) Civil rights (including civil liberties) law means legal representation involving a right of an individual that society has a special interest in protecting.
- (c) Public rights law means legal representation involving an important right belonging to a significant segment of the public.
- (d) Charitable organization representation means legal service to or representation of charitable, religious, civic, governmental and educational institutions in matters in furtherance of the organization's purpose, where the payment of customary legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or where it would be inappropriate.

- (e) Administration of justice means activity, whether under bar association auspices or otherwise, which is designed to increase the availability of legal representation, or otherwise improve the administration of justice. This may include increasing the availability of legal resources to individuals or groups, improving the judicial system, or reforming legal institutions that significantly affect the lives of disadvantaged individuals and groups.

[2] The rights and responsibilities of individuals and organizations in the United States are increasingly defined in legal terms. As a consequence, legal assistance in coping with the web of statutes, rules and regulations is imperative for persons of modest and limited means, as well as for the relatively well-to-do.

[3] The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in or otherwise support the provision of legal services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer as well as the profession generally, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet the need. Thus, it has been necessary for the profession and government to institute additional programs to provide legal services. Accordingly, legal aid offices, lawyer referral services and other related programs have been developed, and others will be developed by the profession and government. Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services.

[4] Typically, to fulfill the aspirational goals in Comment 1, legal services should be performed without the expectation of compensation. If, during the course of representation, a paying client is no longer able to afford a lawyer's legal services, and the lawyer continues to represent the client at no charge, any work performed with the knowledge and intent of no compensation may be considered pro bono legal service.

The award of attorney's fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono does not disqualify such services from fulfilling the foregoing aspirational goals. However, lawyers who receive attorney's fees in pro bono cases are strongly encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means, or that promote access to justice for persons of limited means.

[5] Typically, the following would not fulfill the aspirational goals in Comment 1:

- (a) Legal services written off as bad debts.
- (b) Legal services performed for family members.
- (c) Legal services performed for political organizations for election purposes.
- (d) Activities that do not involve the provision of legal services, such as serving on the board of a charitable organization.

#### **Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments**

A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as when:

- (a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
- (b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or
- (c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.

#### **Comment**

[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1. An individual lawyer may fulfill this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services.

#### **Appointed Counsel**

[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for

example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust.

[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules.

#### **Rule 6.3. Membership in Legal Service Organization**

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization:

- (a) if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or
- (b) where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.

#### **Comment**

[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.

[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances.

#### **Rule 6.4. Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests**

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client.

#### **Comment**

[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. See also Rule 1.2(b). For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefited.

#### **Rule 6.5 Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs**

- (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter:
  - (1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and
  - (2) is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.
- (b) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.

### Comment

[1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services -- such as advice or the completion of legal forms -- that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.

[2] A lawyer who provides short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.

[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.

[4] Because the limited nature of the services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.

[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable.

### **Rule 6.6. Voluntary Attorney Pro Bono Plan**

- (a) The purpose of this voluntary attorney pro bono plan is to promote equal access to justice for all Indiana residents, regardless of economic status, by creating and promoting opportunities for attorneys to provide pro bono civil legal services to persons of limited means, as determined by each district pro bono committee. The voluntary pro bono attorney plan has the following goals:
- (1) To enable Indiana attorneys to discharge their professional responsibilities to provide pro bono services;
  - (2) To improve the overall delivery of civil legal services to persons of limited means by facilitating the integration and coordination of services provided by pro bono organizations and other legal assistance organizations throughout the State of Indiana.
  - (3) To ensure statewide access to high quality and timely pro bono civil legal services for persons of limited means by (i) fostering the development of new pro bono programs where needed and (ii) supporting and improving the quality of existing pro bono programs.
  - (4) To foster the growth of a public service culture within the Indiana Bar which values pro bono publico service.
  - (5) To promote the ongoing development of financial and other resources for pro bono organizations in Indiana.
- (b) There is created a twenty-one (21) member Indiana Pro Bono Commission (the "Commission") the members of which shall be appointed by the Supreme Court and the President of the Indiana Bar Foundation ("Foundation"). In appointing members to the Commission, the Supreme Court and the Foundation should seek to ensure that members of the Commission are representative of the different geographic regions and judicial districts of the state, and that the members possess skills and

experience relevant to the needs of the Commission.

- (1) The Supreme Court shall appoint eleven (11) members as follows:
  - (i) One (1) trial judge and one (1) appellate judge;
  - (ii) Two (2) representatives of pro bono organizations or other legal assistance organizations;
  - (iii) Three (3) representatives from local bar associations; including one representative from a minority bar association;
  - (iv) One (1) representative each from two of the four (4) Indiana law schools accredited by the American Bar Association;
  - (v) One (1) representative of a certified provider of continuing legal education services in the state;
  - (vi) One (1) representative from the community-at-large with experience in assisting persons of limited means.
- (2) The President of the Indiana Bar Foundation shall appoint ten (10) members as follows:
  - (i) Three (3) members of the Indiana State Bar Association;
  - (ii) Two (2) members of the Indiana Bar Foundation;
  - (iii) One (1) representative each from two of the four (4) Indiana law schools accredited by the American Bar Association;
  - (iv) One (1) member of the Indiana State Bar Association Pro Bono Committee;
  - (v) Two (2) representatives of pro bono organizations or other civil legal assistance organizations;
- (3) No more than three of these appointments under (1) and three under (2) may be officers, directors or employees of organizations organized primarily for providers of pro bono legal services or other legal services for the indigent.
- (4) The Supreme Court shall designate the chair of the Commission from among the appointed members. The Executive Director of the Indiana Bar Foundation shall serve as a non-voting ex-officio member of the Commission.
- (5) The Commission shall operate as a program within the Foundation. Members of the Commission shall serve for three (3)-year terms, except that for the initial appointments, four (4) members appointed by the Supreme Court shall serve for one (1)-year terms, four (4) members appointed by the president shall serve for one (1)-year terms, four (4) members appointed by the Supreme Court shall serve for two (2)-year terms, and three (3) members appointed by the president shall serve for two (2)-year terms. Members may be removed by the appointing authority. The appointing authority shall fill any vacancy caused by resignation, removal or otherwise, as it occurs, for the remainder of the vacated term. Members shall not serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms.
- (c) The Foundation shall have the overall responsibility and authority for management of the voluntary attorney pro bono plan. The Foundation's authority and responsibility shall include making funding decisions and disbursing available funds to pro bono organizations/projects upon recommendations of the Commission.
- (d) The Commission shall undertake those tasks delegated to it by the Foundation which are reasonable and necessary to the fulfillment of the Commission's purpose. The Commission, subject to the approval of the Foundation, shall have the responsibility and authority to supervise the district pro bono committees. The Commission shall make funding recommendations to the Foundation in response to district committee pro bono plans and funding requests. The Commission may, with the consent of the Foundation, incorporate as a non-profit corporation.
- (e) The Commission is not authorized to raise funds for itself, other than from IOLTA, in a manner which adversely affects the fund-raising capabilities or reduces the funding of any civil legal assistance provider. With the consent of the Foundation, the Commission is authorized to raise funds for itself, other than from IOLTA, in order to fund its usual and reasonable start-up expenses.
- (f) There shall be one district pro bono committee in each of the fourteen districts set forth below:

District 1, consisting of the counties of Lake, Porter, LaPorte, Starke, Pulaski, Jasper, and Newton;



District 2, consisting of the counties of St. Joseph, Elkhart, Marshall, and Kosciusko;  
District 3, consisting of the counties of LaGrange, Adams, Allen, DeKalb, Huntington, Noble, Steuben, Wells, and Whitley;  
District 4, consisting of the counties of Clinton, Fountain, Montgomery, Tippecanoe, Warren, Benton, Carroll, and White;  
District 5, consisting of the counties of Cass, Fulton, Howard, Miami, Tipton, and Wabash;  
District 6, consisting of the counties of Blackford, Delaware, Grant, Henry, Jay, Madison, and Randolph;  
District 7, consisting of the counties of Clay, Parke, Putnam, Sullivan, Vermillion, and Vigo;  
District 8, consisting of the counties of Boone, Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, Johnson, Marion, Morgan, and Shelby;  
District 9, consisting of the counties of Fayette, Franklin, Rush, Union, and Wayne;  
District 10, consisting of the counties of Greene, Lawrence, Monroe, and Owen;  
District 11, consisting of the counties of Bartholomew, Brown, Decatur, Jackson, and Jennings;  
District 12, consisting of the counties of Dearborn, Jefferson, Ohio, Ripley, and Switzerland;  
District 13, consisting of the counties of Daviess, Dubois, Gibson, Knox, Martin, Perry, Pike, Posey, Spencer, Vanderburgh, and Warrick; and  
District 14, consisting of the counties of Clark, Crawford, Floyd, Harrison, Orange, Scott, and Washington.

The Pro bono committee in each of the above districts shall appoint its chair, in accordance with the following provisions:

- (1) Each district pro bono committee shall be composed of:
  - (a) a judge from the district as designated by the Supreme Court to preside;
  - (b) to the extent feasible, one or more representatives from each voluntary bar association in the district, one representative from each pro bono and legal assistance provider in the district, and one representative from each law school in the district; and
  - (c) at least two (2) community-at-large representatives, one of whom shall be a present or past recipient of pro bono publico legal services.
- (2) Governance of each district pro bono committee and terms of service of the members thereof shall be determined by each committee. Replacement and succession members shall be appointed by the judge designated by the Supreme Court.
- (g) To ensure an active and effective district pro bono program each district committee shall do the following:
  - (1) prepare in written form, on an annual basis, a district pro bono plan, including any county sub-plans if appropriate, after evaluating the needs of the district and making a determination of presently available pro bono services;
  - (2) select and employ a plan administrator to provide the necessary coordination and administrative support for the district pro bono committee;
  - (3) implement the district pro bono plan and monitor its results;
  - (4) submit an annual report to the Commission;
  - (5) submit the plan and funding requests for individual pro bono organizations/projects to the Commission; and
  - (6) forward to the Pro Bono Commission for review and consideration any requests which were presented as formal proposals to be included in the district plan but were rejected by the district committee, provided the group asks for review by the Pro Bono Commission.
- (h) To encourage more lawyers to participate in pro bono activities, each district pro bono plan should provide various support and educational services for participating pro bono attorneys, which, to the extent possible, should include:
  - (1) providing intake, screening, and referral of prospective clients;
  - (2) matching cases with individual attorney expertise, including the establishment of specialized panels;



- (3) providing resources for litigation and out-of-pocket expenses for pro bono cases;
  - (4) providing legal education and training for pro bono attorneys in specialized areas of law useful in providing pro bono civil legal service;
  - (5) providing the availability of consultation with attorneys who have expertise in areas of law with respect to which a volunteer lawyer is providing pro bono civil legal service;
  - (6) providing malpractice insurance for volunteer pro bono lawyers with respect to their pro bono civil legal service;
  - (7) establishing procedures to ensure adequate monitoring and follow-up for assigned cases and to measure client satisfaction;
  - (8) recognizing pro bono civil legal service by lawyers; and
  - (9) providing other support and assistance to pro bono lawyers.
- (i) The district pro bono plan may include opportunities such as the following:
- (1) representing persons of limited means through case referral;
  - (2) representing persons of limited means through direct contact with a lawyer when the lawyer, before undertaking the representation, first determines client eligibility based on standards substantially similar to those used by legal assistance providers;
  - (3) representing community groups serving persons of limited means through case referral;
  - (4) interviewing and determining eligibility of prospective pro bono clients;
  - (5) acting as co-counsel on cases or matters with civil legal assistance providers and other pro bono lawyers;
  - (6) providing consultation services to civil legal assistance providers for case reviews and evaluations;
  - (7) providing training to the staff of civil legal assistance providers and other volunteer pro bono attorneys;
  - (8) making presentations to persons of limited means regarding their rights and obligations under the law;
  - (9) providing legal research;
  - (10) providing guardian ad litem services;
  - (11) serving as a mediator or arbitrator to the client-eligible party; and
  - (12) providing such other pro bono service opportunities as appropriate.

**Rule 7.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services**

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.

**Commentary**

[1] This Rule governs all communications about a lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them must be truthful.

[2] Truthful statements that are misleading are also prohibited by this Rule. In the absence of special circumstances that serve to protect the probable targets of a communication from being misled or deceived, a communication will violate Rule 7.1 if it:

- (1) is intended or is likely to result in a legal action or a legal position being asserted merely to harass or maliciously injure another;
- (2) contains statistical data or other information based on past performance or an express or implied prediction of future success;
- (3) contains a claim about a lawyer, made by a third party, that the lawyer could not personally make

consistent with the requirements of this rule;

- (4) appeals primarily to a lay person's fear, greed, or desire for revenge;
- (5) compares the services provided by the lawyer or a law firm with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;
- (6) contains any reference to results obtained that may reasonably create an expectation of similar results in future matters;
- (7) contains a dramatization or re-creation of events unless the advertising clearly and conspicuously discloses that a dramatization or re-creation is being presented;
- (8) contains a representation, testimonial, or endorsement of a lawyer or other statement that, in light of all the circumstances, is intended or is likely to create an unjustified expectation about a lawyer or law firm or a person's legal rights;
- (9) states or implies that a lawyer is a certified or recognized specialist other than as permitted by Rule 7.4;
- (10) is prohibited by Rule 7.3.

[3] See also Rule 8.4(e) for the prohibition against stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

#### **Rule 7.2. Advertising**

- (a) Subject to the requirements of this rule, lawyers and law firms may advertise their professional services and law related services. The term "advertise" as used in these Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct refers to any manner of public communication partly or entirely intended or expected to promote the purchase or use of the professional services of a lawyer, law firm, or any employee of either involving the practice of law or law-related services.
- (b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending or advertising the lawyer's services except that a lawyer may:
  - (1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this Rule;
  - (2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service described in Rule 7.3(d);
  - (3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17; and
  - (4) refer clients to another lawyer or a non-lawyer professional pursuant to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under these Rules that provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, if
    - (i) the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive, and
    - (ii) the client is informed of the existence and nature of the agreement.
- (c) Any communication subject to this rule shall include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content. The lawyer or law firm responsible for the content of any communication subject to this rule shall keep a copy or recording of each such communication for six years after its dissemination.

#### **Commentary**

[1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising.

[2] Provided that the advertising otherwise complies with the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct, permissible subjects of advertising include:

- (1) name and contact information, including the name and contact information for an attorney, a law firm, and professional associates;

- (2) one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, using commonly accepted and understood definitions and designations;
- (3) date and place of birth;
- (4) date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
- (5) schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees, and other scholastic distinctions;
- (6) academic, public or quasi-public, military, or professional positions held;
- (7) military service;
- (8) legal authorship;
- (9) legal teaching position;
- (10) memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar professional, scientific, or technical associations or societies;
- (11) memberships and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
- (12) technical and professional licenses;
- (13) memberships in scientific, technical, and professional associations and societies;
- (14) foreign language ability;
- (15) names and addresses of bank references;
- (16) professional liability insurance coverage;
- (17) prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer participates as allowed by Rule 7.3 (d);
- (18) whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
- (19) office and telephone answering service hours; and
- (20) fees charged and other terms of service pursuant to which an attorney is willing to provide legal or law-related services.

[3] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.

[4] Lawyers are not permitted to pay others for channeling professional work. Paragraph (b)(1), however, allows a lawyer to pay for advertising and communications permitted by this Rule, including the costs of print directory listings, on-line directory listings, newspaper ads, television and radio airtime, domain-name registrations, sponsorship fees, banner ads, and group advertising. A lawyer may compensate employees, agents, and vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client-development services, such as publicists, public-relations personnel, business-development staff, and website designers. See Rule 5.3 for the duties of lawyers and law firms with respect to the conduct of non-lawyers who prepare marketing materials for them.

#### **Rule 7.3. Direct Contact with prospective Clients**

- (a) A lawyer (including the lawyer's employee or agent) shall not by in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted:
  - (1) is a lawyer; or
  - (2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer.
- (b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by in-person or by written, recorded, audio, video, or electronic communication, including the Internet, if:
  - (1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer;
  - (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment;
  - (3) the solicitation concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the solicitation is addressed or a relative of that

- person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the initiation of the solicitation;
- (4) the solicitation concerns a specific matter and the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, that the person to whom the solicitation is directed is represented by a lawyer in the matter; or
  - (5) the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, that the physical, emotional, or mental state of the person makes it unlikely that the person would exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.
- (c) Every written, recorded, or electronic communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment from a prospective client potentially in need of legal services in a particular matter shall include the words "Advertising Material" conspicuously placed both on the face of any outside envelope and at the beginning of any written communication, and both at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic communication, unless the recipient of the communication is a person specified in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2). A copy of each such communication shall be filed with the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission at or prior to its dissemination to the prospective client. A filing fee in the amount of fifty dollars (\$50.00) payable to the "Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission Fund" shall accompany each such filing. In the event a written, recorded, or electronic communication is distributed to multiple prospective clients, a single copy of the mailing less information specific to the intended recipients, such as name, address (including email address) and date of mailing, may be filed with the Commission. Each time any such communication is changed or altered, a copy of the new or modified communication shall be filed with the Disciplinary Commission at or prior to the time of its mailing or distribution. The lawyer shall retain a list containing the names and addresses, including email addresses, of all persons or entities to whom each communication has been mailed or distributed for a period of not less than one (1) year following the last date of mailing or distribution. Communications filed pursuant to this subdivision shall be open to public inspection.
- (d) A lawyer shall not accept referrals from, make referrals to, or solicit clients on behalf of any lawyer referral service unless such service falls within clauses (1)-(4) below. A lawyer or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm may be recommended, employed, or paid by, or cooperate with, one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of the lawyer's services or those of the lawyer's firm, if there is no interference with the exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm:
- (1) A legal office or public defender office:
    - (A) operated or sponsored on a not-for-profit basis by a law school accredited by the American Bar Association Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar;
    - (B) operated or sponsored on a not-for-profit basis by a bona fide non-profit community organization;
    - (C) operated or sponsored on a not-for-profit basis by a governmental agency;
    - (D) operated, sponsored, or approved in writing by the Indiana State Bar Association, the Indiana Trial Lawyers Association, the Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana, any bona fide county or city bar association within the State of Indiana, or any other bar association whose lawyer referral service has been sanctioned for operation in Indiana by the Indiana Disciplinary Commission; and
    - (E) operated by a Circuit or Superior Court within the State of Indiana.
  - (2) A military legal assistance office;
  - (3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by any organization listed in clause (1) (D); or
  - (4) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only if the following conditions are met:
    - (A) the primary purposes of such organization do not include the rendition of legal services;
    - (B) the recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to its members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary purposes of such organization;
    - (C) such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of legal services by

the lawyer; and

- (D) the member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter.
- (e) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client, except that the lawyer may pay for public communication permitted by Rule 7.2 and the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service falling within the provisions of paragraph (d) above.
- (f) A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, that the person who seeks the lawyer's services does so as a result of lawyer conduct prohibited under this Rule 7.3.

#### Commentary

[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact by a lawyer with a prospective client known to need legal services. These forms of contact between a lawyer and a prospective client subject the layperson to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a direct interpersonal encounter. The prospective client, who may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services, may find it difficult fully to evaluate all available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate self-interest in the face of the lawyer's presence and insistence upon being retained immediately. The situation is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching.

[2] This potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyer advertising and written and recorded communication permitted under Rule 7.2 offer alternative means of conveying necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services.

[3] The use of general advertising and written, recorded, or electronic communications to transmit information from lawyer to prospective client, rather than direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact, will help to assure that the information flows cleanly as well as freely. The contents of advertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 can be permanently recorded so that they cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know the lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely to help guard against statements and claims that might constitute false and misleading communications, in violation of Rule 7.1. The contents of direct in-person, live telephone, or real-time electronic conversations between a lawyer and a prospective client can be disputed and may not be subject to third-party scrutiny. Consequently, they are much more likely to approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate representations and those that are false and misleading.

[4] There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an individual who is a former client, or with whom the lawyer has close personal or family relationship, or in situations in which the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain. Nor is there a serious potential for abuse when the person contacted is a lawyer. Consequently, the general prohibition in Rule 7.3(a) and the requirements of Rule 7.3(c) are not applicable in those situations. Also, paragraph (a) is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of public or charitable legal-service organizations or bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee, or trade organizations whose purposes include providing or recommending legal services to its members or beneficiaries.

[5] But even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused. Thus, any solicitation which contains information which is false or misleading within the meaning of Rule 7.1, which involves coercion, duress, or harassment within the meaning of Rule 7.3(b)(2), or which involves contact with a prospective client who has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer within the meaning of Rule 7.3(b)(1) is prohibited. Moreover, if after sending a letter or other communication to a client as permitted by Rule 7.2, the lawyer receives no response, any further effort to communicate with the prospective client may violate the provisions of Rule 7.3(b).

[6] This rule allows targeted solicitation of potential plaintiffs or claimants in personal injury and wrongful death causes of action or other causes of action that relate to an accident, disaster, death, or injury, but only if such solicitation is initiated no less than 30 days after the incident. This restriction is reasonably required by the sensitized state of the potential clients, who may be either injured or grieving over the loss of a family member, and the abuses that experience has shown exist in this type of solicitation.



**Rule 7.4. Communication of Fields of Practice and Specialization**

- (a) A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law.
- (b) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patent Attorney" or a substantially similar designation.
- (c) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may use the designation "Admiralty," "Proctor in Admiralty" or a substantially similar designation.
- (d) A lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is a specialist in a particular field of law, unless:
  - (1) The lawyer has been certified as a specialist by an Independent Certifying Organization accredited by the Indiana Commission for Continuing Legal Education pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 30; and,
  - (2) The certifying organization is identified in the communication.
- (e) Pursuant to rule-making powers inherent in its ability and authority to police and regulate the practice of law by attorneys admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court hereby vests exclusive authority for accreditation of Independent Certifying Organizations that certify specialists in legal practice areas and fields in the Indiana Commission for Continuing Legal Education. The Commission shall be the exclusive accrediting body in Indiana, for purposes of Rule 7.4(d)(1), above; and shall promulgate rules and guidelines for accrediting Independent Certifying Organizations that certify specialists in legal practice areas and fields. The rules and guidelines shall include requirements of practice experience, continuing legal education, objective examination; and, peer review and evaluation, with the purpose of providing assurance to the consumers of legal services that the attorneys attaining certification within areas of specialization have demonstrated extraordinary proficiency within those areas of specialization. The Supreme Court shall retain review oversight with respect to the Commission, its requirements, and its rules and guidelines. The Supreme Court retains the power to alter or amend such requirements, rules and guidelines; and, to review the actions of the Commission in respect to this Rule 7.4.

**Commentary**

[1] Paragraph (a) of this Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in a specified field or fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes the long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office for the designation of lawyers practicing before the Office. Paragraph (c) recognizes that designation of Admiralty practice has a long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce and the federal courts.

**Rule 7.5. Firm Names and Letterheads**

- (a) Firm names, letterheads, and other professional designations are subject to the following requirements:
  - (1) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.
  - (2) The name of a professional corporation, professional association, limited liability partnership, or limited liability company may contain, "P.C.," "P.A.," "LLP," or "LLC" or similar symbols indicating the nature of the organization.
  - (3) If otherwise lawful a firm may use as, or continue to include in, its name, the name or names of one or more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession. See Admission & Discipline Rule 27.
  - (4) A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice subject to the following requirements:
    - (i) the name shall not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization and shall not otherwise violate Rule 7.1.
    - (ii) the name shall include the name of a lawyer (or the name of a deceased or retired member of the firm, or of a predecessor firm in a manner that complies with subparagraph (2) above).
    - (iii) the name shall not include words other than words that comply with clause (ii) above and



words that:

- (A) identify the field of law in which the firm concentrates its work, or
  - (B) describe the geographic location of its offices, or
  - (C) indicate a language fluency.
- (b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name or other professional designation in Indiana if the name or other designation does not violate paragraph (a) and the identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm indicates the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in Indiana.
- (c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm. A member of a part-time legislative body such as the General Assembly, a county or city council, or a school board is not subject to this rule.
- (d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when they in fact do so.

#### Commentary

[1] A firm may be designated by the names of all or some of its members, by the names of deceased members where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity, or by a trade name that complies with the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer or law firm may also be designated by a distinctive website address or comparable professional designation. The use of a trade name in law practice is acceptable so long as it is not misleading and otherwise complies with the requirements of paragraph (a)(4). A firm name that includes the name of a deceased partner is, strictly speaking, a trade name. The use of such names to designate law firms has proven a useful means of identification. However, it is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm, or the name of a non-lawyer.

[2] With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact associated with each other in a law firm, may not denominate themselves as, for example, "Smith and Jones," for that title suggests that they are practicing law together in a firm.

#### **Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters**

An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

- (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
- (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

#### Comment

[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. Paragraph (b) of this Rule also requires correction of any prior misstatement in the matter that the applicant or lawyer may have made and affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.

[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule.

[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship,

including Rule 1.6 and, in some cases, Rule 3.3.

### **Rule 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials**

- (a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
- (b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

#### **Comment**

[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity.

[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.

### **Rule 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct**

- (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
- (b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
- (c) This Rule does not require reporting of a violation or disclosure of information if such action would involve disclosure of information that is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6, or is gained by a lawyer while providing advisory opinions or telephone advice on legal ethics issues as a member of a bar association committee or similar entity formed for the purposes of providing such opinions or advice and designated by the Indiana Supreme Court.
- (d) The relationship between lawyers or judges acting on behalf of a judges or lawyers assistance program approved by the Supreme Court, and lawyers or judges who have agreed to seek assistance from and participate in any such programs, shall be considered one of attorney and client, with its attendant duty of confidentiality and privilege from disclosure.

#### **Comment**

[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

[2] A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve violation of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests.

[3] If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial" refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made to the bar disciplinary agency unless some other agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in the circumstances. Similar considerations apply to the reporting of judicial misconduct.

[4] The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.

[5] Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct or fitness may be received by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer's participation in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for an exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule encourages lawyers and judges to seek treatment through such a program. Conversely, without such an exception, lawyers and judges may hesitate to seek assistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and the public. These Rules do not otherwise address the confidentiality of information received by a lawyer or judge participating in an approved lawyers assistance program; such an obligation, however, may be imposed by the rules of the program or other law.

#### **Rule 8.4. Misconduct**

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

- (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
- (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
- (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
- (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
- (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
- (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or
- (g) engage in conduct, in a professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate this subsection. A trial judge's finding that preemptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule.

#### **Comment**

[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.

[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

[3] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

[4] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.

**Rule 8.5. Disciplinary Authority: Choice of Law**

- (a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
- (b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
  - (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
  - (2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.

**Comment****Disciplinary Authority**

[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to other lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. A lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.

**Choice of Law**

[2] A lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.

[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct and (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions.

[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer's conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction.

[5] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.

[6] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise.

**USE OF NON-LAWYER ASSISTANTS****Introduction**

Subject to the provisions in Rule 5.3, all lawyers may use non-lawyer assistants in accordance with the following guidelines.

**Guideline 9.1. Supervision**

A non-lawyer assistant shall perform services only under the direct supervision of a lawyer authorized to practice in the State of Indiana and in the employ of the lawyer or the lawyer's employer. Independent non-lawyer assistants, to-wit, those not employed by a specific firm or by specific lawyers are prohibited. A lawyer is responsible for all of the professional actions of a non-lawyer assistant performing services at the lawyer's direction and should take reasonable measures to insure that the non-lawyer assistant's conduct is consistent with the lawyer's obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct.

**Guideline 9.2. Permissible Delegation**

Provided the lawyer maintains responsibility for the work product, a lawyer may delegate to a non-lawyer assistant or paralegal any task normally performed by the lawyer; however, any task prohibited by statute, court rule, administrative rule or regulation, controlling authority, or the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct may not be assigned to a non-lawyer.

**Guideline 9.3. Prohibited Delegation**

A lawyer may not delegate to a non-lawyer assistant:

- (a) responsibility for establishing an attorney-client relationship;
- (b) responsibility for establishing the amount of a fee to be charged for a legal service; or
- (c) responsibility for a legal opinion rendered to a client.

**Guideline 9.4. Duty to Inform**

It is the lawyer's responsibility to take reasonable measures to ensure that clients, courts, and other lawyers are aware that a non-lawyer assistant, whose services are utilized by the lawyer in performing legal services, is not licensed to practice law.

**Guideline 9.5. Identification on Letterhead**

A lawyer may identify non-lawyer assistants by name and title on the lawyer's letterhead and on business cards identifying the lawyer's firm.

**Guideline 9.6. Client Confidences**

It is the responsibility of a lawyer to take reasonable measures to ensure that all client confidences are preserved by non-lawyer assistants.

**Guideline 9.7. Charge for Services**

A lawyer may charge for the work performed by non-lawyer assistants.

**Guideline 9.8. Compensation**

A lawyer may not split legal fees with a non-lawyer assistant nor pay a non-lawyer assistant for the referral of legal business. A lawyer may compensate a non-lawyer assistant based on the quantity and quality of the non-lawyer assistant's work and the value of that work to a law practice, but the non-lawyer assistant's compensation may not be contingent, by advance agreement, upon the profitability of the lawyer's practice.

**Guideline 9.9. Continuing Legal Education**

A lawyer who employs a non-lawyer assistant should facilitate the non-lawyer assistant's participation in appropriate continuing education and pro bono publico activities.

**Guideline 9.10. Legal Assistant Ethics**

All lawyers who employ non-lawyer assistants in the State of Indiana shall assure that such non-lawyer assistants conform their conduct to be consistent with the following ethical standards:

- (a) A non-lawyer assistant may perform any task delegated and supervised by a lawyer so long as the lawyer



is responsible to the client, maintains a direct relationship with the client, and assumes full professional responsibility for the work product.

- (b) A non-lawyer assistant shall not engage in the unauthorized practice of law.
- (c) A non-lawyer assistant shall serve the public interest by contributing to the delivery of quality legal services and the improvement of the legal system.
- (d) A non-lawyer assistant shall achieve and maintain a high level of competence, as well as a high level of personal and professional integrity and conduct.
- (e) A non-lawyer assistant's title shall be fully disclosed in all business and professional communications.
- (f) A non-lawyer assistant shall preserve all confidential information provided by the client or acquired from other sources before, during, and after the course of the professional relationship.
- (g) A non-lawyer assistant shall avoid conflicts of interest and shall disclose any possible conflict to the employer or client, as well as to the prospective employers or clients.
- (h) A non-lawyer assistant shall act within the bounds of the law, uncompromisingly for the benefit of the client.
- (i) A non-lawyer assistant shall do all things incidental, necessary, or expedient for the attainment of the ethics and responsibilities imposed by statute or rule of court.
- (j) A non-lawyer assistant shall be governed by the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (k) For purposes of this Guideline, a non-lawyer assistant includes but shall not be limited to: paralegals, legal assistants, investigators, law students and paraprofessionals.



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## **CELL PHONE SPYWARE FACTS**

- The manner in which spyware is installed on the phone is dependent upon the capabilities of the phone itself
  - Smart phones can have spyware downloaded from websites, Bluetooth connection, mms messages, and pc connection.
- There is no single spyware program that can be installed on all phones since there are many different OS's and each one must have code written for the specific OS.
- Symbian OS is the most common OS but has hundreds if not thousands of different versions depending on the software development intended on the device. Many spyware programs cannot work for more than a few versions, if even more than one version.
- Spyware programs that can be installed via Bluetooth connection claim to be able to install software remotely but as with all Bluetooth devices it must have been paired with the target phone first.
- It is possible for the remote installation of spyware onto a target phone, but this involves "tricking" the user into downloading and installing the malware.
  - Sending bogus mms messages with the intent to install malware is the easiest way to trick a target user. By sending messages with fake links could get the user to unknowingly download spyware programs. Most of these attacks involve making the user think the messages came from the carrier and posing as upgrades to the firmware on the phone especially through email. Some techniques use photos embedded with third party steganography hiding the spyware.
- Some spyware claims that it can extract data and voice from a target phone without installing any spyware on the target phone. We are still researching a specific software with this claim but at this time we can neither confirm nor deny this possibility.
- Spyware programs can collect the following information and possibly more: contact data, mms, sms, phone call history, email history, webpage history, pictures, video, GPS location, cell tower triangulation history (less accurate), file system information.
- Spyware programs can remotely become a covert third party to conversations as well as use the phone as a bug so that room audio is available whenever the bad guy chooses. The spyware can alert the bad guy when a call is made as well as texts and emails so they can call the phone and listen in. No call history for the bad guys phone is saved on the phone although it will show up in the service providers records.
- As far as prevention of spyware installation is concerned, blackberry's have the best protection by far. The security code can only be guessed a certain number of times before it completely erases all information from the phone and has no obvious "backdoor" to circumvent this issue. Other phones can be protected more or less by passwords but the password must not be too easy to guess and some phones can allow a reset of the password, which is not that hard to accomplish in the wrong hands.
- There is no known blanket spyware protections that will protect all cell phones

## **UNCONVENTIONAL COVERT ESPIONAGE TECHNIQUES**

The following techniques can be found and ordered (purchased) over the internet from foreign spy device suppliers, shipped to the US and rarely intercepted by US Customs.

A device that can be cleverly concealed in a FAX machine, which will copy all faxed documents along with the phone numbers and at a later time, upon a command from the bad guy, download all of the copies. This device can also be commanded, by the bad guy, to turn on an amplified microphone to monitor the conversations around the fax machine. There are many configurations that are available.

A similar device to the FAX bug can be installed in a printer or copy machine. Most of the newer copy machines utilize a hard drive that maintains a copy of every document copied (scanned). These are easily accessed by service techs or "others" that have physical access to the office area.

Most offices utilize shredders; some have a large collection box which is periodically picked up by a trusted shredding company. Others utilize the small standalone units. There is an overseas company that provides a bugged shredder that has a hidden digital scanner built into the injected molded plastic document insertion top.

There are 3 models:

- One has a hidden micro SD card that will hold 30k to 40k of documents.
- One has an electrical "digital carrier current" transmitter that transmits the documents over the electrical power lines to a matched receiver somewhere else in the building. That receiver has a printer connected so that while the document is being shredded in one office, it is being printed out in another office.
- The third model incorporates a RF transmitter/receiver which is connected to a document storage device. This allows the bad guy to pull his vehicle into the office parking lot and transmit a RF signal to the shredder (similar to a garage door opener) which causes the unit to "burst transmit" all of the stored documents to the bad guy's receiver.

Several overseas companies offer Cellular bugs, which are an entire cell phone packaged in a tiny circuit, cleverly hidden in innocent appearing appliances, i.e.: Computer Mouse, Computer Keyboard, Power Strip Surge Suppressor, Table Clock, Wall Clock, Wall Thermostat, Clock Radio, Electric Pencil Sharpener, and many more devices that have an ongoing electrical power source. They even have them designed for monitoring you in your car with a bugged Radar Detector and Car DC to AC Power Inverter.

For those offices or homes that utilize Comcast, Bright house, AT&T U-verse, etc. BEWARE... If they provide broadband for your computers and VoIP for your phone service, you can be monitored by the bad guys. All cable subscribers have an IP address. This is so that the cable company can perform remote diagnostics, firmware and software modifications and upgrades. There are a number of software programs available, i.e. (Wireshark), that will allow the bad guys to invade your IP address (by "spoofing" the carrier for the address) and monitor your VoIP phone calls, turn on the microphones in your computers and listen to the conversations around your computers. They can also view everything on your computer hard drive. Your most secure source for TV is through the Satellite or Dish networks. VoIP is inherently vulnerable regardless of the provider. Skype is also vulnerable.

**NOTE:** All of the above eavesdropping and data interception techniques are criminal offenses covered under Public Law 90-351, Title III, Chapter 18, USC2510-2520 and most state laws

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Be cognizant of all of the above malevolent technologies.
- Employ as many countermeasures as possible.
- During sensitive meetings remove all cell phones or purchase cell signal detectors and jammers.
- Purchase and install acoustic noise generators (white/pink noise transducers) in offices/conference rooms where sensitive meetings take place, and hidden motion activated video cameras which will record and document unauthorized intruders.
- Periodically employ a high level technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) team to conduct "sweeps" in the sensitive areas. Some larger firms utilize "Safe rooms" that provide a high level of voice privacy.

## WHAT ARE SOME INDICATORS THAT MY CELL PHONE MIGHT HAVE MALWARE/SPYWARE?

Top 10 suspicious indicators that your cell phone might have illegally installed spyware:

1. Battery is warm when not in use
2. Battery life is noticeably diminished each day.
3. Some Blackberry's; communication icon on right screen flashing
4. Small pauses of audible communication while talking
5. Light audible tones, beeps or clicks throughout conversation
6. Flashing or flickering on display or change of brightness
7. Some spyware programs require the spy to manually mute their phone, therefore you might hear them in the background at the beginning of conversation or when they tap in.
8. Slower internet access.
9. Suspicious 3rd parties have detailed knowledge of your private conversations and locations (GPS)
10. You have opened a suspicious email or one from a potential spy. (allowing Trojan horse to install spyware remotely)

The smarter the cell phones the easier it is to hide spyware.

If the eavesdropping perpetrator has effectively installed spyware on your phone, then that perpetrator has total control, i.e. obtain all text messages, emails, internet sites visited GPS location, photos and videos obtained, etc.

## ABOUT US

In 2004, International Investigators, Inc., our parent company, was involved in a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures sweep of a Client's home and office in Orange County, California. When no bugs, eavesdropping devices or wire taps were found in either location, one of our team members began further questioning of our Client in an attempt to determine what could possibly have been used to conduct an effective eavesdropping operation on her private conversations with her attorney and others. It was learned that the only common denominator was her cell phone which her estranged husband had physical access to during their cohabitation. Her husband was an IT expert with a large company and had access to this spyware technology. At that point we had no experience with cell phone bugs or how to handle them, but knew the protocol when examining computers for Trojan horses or spyware. Since a cell phone was just a less complicated computer at that time, we treated it as such. Upon further investigation a malware (usually referred to as spyware or Trojan horse), program was found in the phone that enabled her husband to monitor her cell phone conversations and more specifically to remotely turn on her cell phone while it was in the standby mode, either in her purse or on a table and obtaining clear audio of conversations surrounding the phone. This was the beginning of our mobile forensics lab.

Today our mobile forensics lab division utilizes state of the art software and hardware platforms to search for even the most covert malware programs that can be installed in today's high-tech phones. We are part of a mobile forensics collaboration with the leading examiners in the United States that exchange information so that we are always aware of new malware programs that are literally "born" each day. Mobile forensics examiners in the collaboration find nearly 10 to 15 new malware programs per day with well over 4,000 completely different types or variations known to be in existence presently.

## OUR PROCEDURE

The first step involves always keeping powered phones in a Faraday case to prevent signals from leaving and entering the phone. One problem that is becoming more prevalent is that more malware/spyware programs are being found with remote software removal functions that allow the perpetrator to remove the malware from the phone remotely. Although it can sometimes leave traces of its prior existence, more information could have been detected and obtained had the phone been protected from these removal functions, therefore by keeping the phones in Faraday cases we remove this problem completely.

Examiner then physically examines the phone while in a Faraday case to determine if there are any signs of malware while testing the functionality of the phone. This can provide valuable first clues as to the type of malware that has already been installed into the device.

In order to obtain any information from the phone we must first connect to the phone's operating system SIM card if applicable. The two main methods of connecting the phone itself involve either a USB connection and/or a Blue Tooth connection. We always use USB connections since it is the most secure connection and easiest to work with when the phone is in the Faraday case. Once the phone is connected to our software, we then perform a memory dump. This basically extracts all possible data from the phone onto our computer for isolated examination. We then search through the data for any signs of malware and attempt to locate its origin, although locating its origin is not likely, it is however possible. We then run the data through a 2nd software package that attempts to locate any malware that might have been missed on the 1st run. This process is extensive and can take many hours on some phones. **WE WILL NOT DELETE ANYTHING FROM THE PHONE UNLESS YOU REQUEST THAT WE DO SO.**

Once the examination is complete, we then generate a detailed report of our exact findings. Some reports are more extensive than others depending upon the model examined and how robust its operating system is.

## CAN I EXAMINE MY OWN PHONE?

It is nearly impossible on most phones to detect malware without the use of sophisticated software. Not only is forensic spyware detection software expensive, it is also highly complex and difficult to master. Furthermore, the software is only as good as the examiner who utilizes it. The examiner must not only know how to operate the software to its full potential but also be able to manually search through the data (lines of code) to find the spyware. An examiner must have completed multiple certification courses prior to becoming an expert examiner. This is particularly useful if any evidence obtained is to be introduced into a court of law. Credibility is very important in technical evidence.

## HOW DO I GET MY PHONE TO YOU?

We recommend placing the phone in a well protected container with the battery separated from the phone and supplied along with the charger. If you are unable to remove the battery from the phone then we highly recommend that you turn it off and wrap the phone 8 or 10 times with metal foil which will essentially become a Faraday cage. This will prevent any signals from leaving or entering the phone prior to our examination. Once we receive your phone an examination begins within one business day and usually takes approximately seven days to complete prior to sending the phone back to you. Sometimes we are able to accomplish the examination in less time.



Price  
\$1,209.00

#### COMPUTER KEYBOARD HIDDEN AUDIO MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a computer keyboard.

**New Feature: Voice Activation!** The unit will call YOU when it detects sounds.

Price  
\$1,209.00



Price  
\$1,209.00

#### THERMOSTAT HIDDEN AUDIO MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a non-functional thermostat.

**New Feature: Voice Activation!** The unit will call YOU when it detects sounds.



Price  
\$1,209.00

Rental  
\$175.00/wk

#### COMPUTER MOUSE HIDDEN AUDIO MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a fully functional computer mouse.

**Now Includes Sound or Voice-Activation!**



Price  
\$1,209.00

Rental  
\$175.00/wk

#### WALL CLOCK HIDDEN AUDIO MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a fully functional wall clock.

**Now Includes Sound or Voice-Activation!**



Price  
\$175.00/wk

#### ALARM CLOCK RADIO HIDDEN AUDIO MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a fully functional alarm clock radio.

**Now Includes Sound or Voice-Activation!**



Price  
\$1,209.00

Rental  
\$175.00/wk

#### POWER STRIP HIDDEN AUDIO (GSM-BASED) MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a fully functional power strip.

**Now Includes Sound or Voice-Activation!**



Price  
\$1,209.00

Rental  
\$175.00/wk

#### RADAR DETECTOR HIDDEN AUDIO MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a fully functional radar detector.

**Now Includes Sound or Voice-Activation!**



Price  
\$1,209.00

Rental  
\$175.00/wk

#### CAR (DC TO AC) POWER INVERTER HIDDEN AUDIO MONITORING DEVICE

This revolutionary surveillance product has a hidden GSM-based audio monitoring device hidden inside a fully functional car (DC to AC) power inverter.

**Now Includes Sound or Voice-Activation!**